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Pension reform
Ukraine's pension system does a poor job 
of protecting pensioners from poverty, 
and workers do not have reliable saving
mechanisms. Realising the necessity to conduct
pension reform, the government has developed 
a draft law that envisages reforming the solidarity
system and introducing a mandatory
accumulation system. 
The mandatory accumulation system is expected
to increase social protection of the poorest
societal strata, provide workers with a saving
mechanism for their retirement, and increase 
the supply of capital in the economy. However,
successful implementation of the system requires
a favourable economic situation in Ukraine,
personification of pension accounts, proper
regulation of the newly created private pension
system, and public awareness of the risks 
and benefits of the new system.
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Introduction 
kraine’s present pension system does a poor job of protecting the elderly from 
poverty. State pensions are too small to allow elderly people to pay for basic food, 
shelter, clothing, and other essential goods and services – although exactly how far 
pension benefits are below a reasonable measure of the poverty level is impossible to 
measure accurately, because Ukraine has still not established a poverty level. Most 
Ukrainian pensioners rely on family members and on food grown on their private land 
plots, or continue working in order to survive.  
Another issue is equity. Today, there is not much difference between a pension re'
ceived by someone who worked for only five years –  UAH per month – and the aver'
age pension received by retirees who worked most of their lives – . UAH. Few peo'
ple think this is fair or desirable.  
Despite providing such low pension benefits, the state pension system requires enter'
prises to pay a high contribution rate in order to raise enough money to pay out bene'
fits; and even then, pensions are often paid late. The high contribution rate, combined 
with the low level of benefits (especially for individuals with high wages), has encour'
aged enterprises and individuals to move into the shadow economy, where they avoid 
paying both pension benefits and income taxes. Of an estimated  million Ukrainian 
workers, only about  million are making regular contributions to the Pension Fund. 
The present Ukrainian pension system does not provide working people with safe fi'
nancial systems for saving for their own retirement. Millions of Ukrainians lost most of 
their lifetime savings during the hyperinflation of '. Many people who invested 
in the private pension funds that were created in the early s also suffered losses 
when many of the funds collapsed. Most people do not have sufficient confidence in 
commercial banks because many of these are not secure, and successive devaluations of 
the Ukrainian currency and renewed double'digit inflation have eroded the real value 
of savings accounts. As a result of the low level of savings in Ukrainian financial institu'
tions, there is insufficient capital to meet Ukrainian enterprises’ desperate need for 
more short'term and long'term capital. 
As Ukrainians live longer, and as the number of working Ukrainians shrinks because of 
today’s low fertility rate, these problems will get worse. 
The government of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada have been debating the reform 
of the state pension system for several years. In April , the President of Ukraine 
approved the basic reform policy, following which the Cabinet of Ministers has already 
developed two draft laws. The draft Law “On Mandatory State Pension Insurance” was 
submitted by the government to the Verkhovna Rada in August . 
Projections in this report—prepared by Mitchell Wiener, an expert from the PADCO 
company—examine the financial sustainability of the Pension Fund of Ukraine, under 
the present law and under the new law submitted by the government. Particular em'
phasis is given problems with the existing pension system and difficulties associated 
with implementing the new Law. 
U 
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Aсhieving the goals of the pension 
system 
Pension systems have two major goals—to guarantee a minimum standard of 
living for all old people and to establish safe means through which working 
people can save money for their own retirement. However, achievement of these 
goals involves numerous problems. In order to overcome them, most governments 
have developed so!called three!pillar pension systems. This same strategy is 
envisaged in the “Basic Policy on Pension System Reform in Ukraine”, approved 
by the President of Ukraine in . 
Defining the goals of the pension  
system 
Concern for the elderly has become a central part of govern'
ment policy in Ukraine, as people live longer and an ever'
larger share of the population is of pensionable age. Many 
elderly people can no longer be expected to support them'
selves by working. Consequently, the following two major 
goals of the pension system were determined:  
• to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all old 
people; and 
• to establish safe means through which working people can 
save money for their own retirement. 
Unfortunately, the twin goals of the pension system often 
work against each other. This is one of the reasons why the 
debate over pension policy in Ukraine is so difficult. If the 
government guarantees a minimum standard of living for all 
old people, for example, many working people may not 
bother to save as much for their own retirement. They may 
ask themselves, why sacrifice expenditures today if the gov'
ernment will provide pension benefits in the future? At the 
same time, if the government continues to pay large benefits 
from the pay'as'you'go system, working people will have to 
pay larger payroll contributions today – encouraging them to 
work in the shadow economy where the burden of such con'
tributions is smaller. 
Creating a safe system that lets people set aside money for 
themselves is proving just as difficult as creating a pension 
Generally, pension sys*
tems have two major 
goals: to guarantee a 
minimum standard of 
living for all old people 
and to establish safe 
means through which 
working people can save 
for their own retirement. 
However, achievement of 
the two goals simultane*
ously is not an easy task. 
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system that provides adequate and equitable benefits. The 
problem is that the managers of financial institutions are not 
always competent or honest. When workers place money into 
a pension fund that they will not need for  or  years, 
there is strong temptation to use it for risky investments, or 
simply to steal it.  
In an unfettered situation, enterprise managers in the West 
might be no more honest than those in Ukraine, but, as fi'
nancial institutions evolved there, so too did laws and regula'
tory systems, in order to oversee private financial institutions 
and keep incompetence and mismanagement to a minimum. 
Well'paid regulators strictly enforce these laws and regula'
tions. The overall result has been the evolution of highly 
trained and skilled financial experts working in private finan'
cial institutions, whose high salaries reflect their measured 
performance rather than their close political contacts.  
The three'pillar pension system 
There is no single pension program that overcomes all men'
tioned problems. Therefore, most countries have developed 
pension systems that have separate parts: a solidarity system, a 
mandatory accumulation system, and a voluntary accumula'
tion system. 
The solidarity system ensures that everyone, regardless of 
how much or how little they worked, receives at least some'
thing after they retire. These benefits are not always provided 
through a pension system, though. They are sometimes pro'
vided through the nation’s social assistance system – govern'
ment'financed benefits paid to the poor. For example, if the 
government provides for a guaranteed minimum income for 
all families, then the elderly, as well as single mothers and 
other poor people, can be paid benefits that ensure that they 
can afford basic food, clothing, and shelter. Such welfare 
programs do not necessarily have to be financed through 
payroll contribution, but can be find out of general govern'
ment revenues.  
Since such a solidarity, or welfare, system can usually afford 
to pay monthly benefits that are small relative to prevailing 
wages (in the United States, Social Security payments are only 
% of an average income before retirement), the solidarity 
                                                                
 See Appendix A for a profile of pension systems in different coun'
tries of the world. 
To overcome all problems, 
most countries have de*
veloped pension systems 
that have separate parts: 
a solidarity system, a 
mandatory accumulation 
system, and a voluntary 
accumulation system. 
The result is often re*
ferred to as a “three*
pillar” pension system. 
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system is usually supplemented by other pension programs. 
These other programs allow people to accumulate savings for 
their own retirement. To overcome the problem that guaran'
teed benefits to the elderly discourage people from saving 
enough for their old age, these pension savings programs 
may be made mandatory.  
Mandatory accumulation systems require working people to 
pay a certain amount of their wages into individual savings 
accounts. The money is invested, and participants are al'
lowed to withdraw the money (plus the income earned on 
investments) only when they have reached retirement age. 
The solidarity system retains the responsibility of paying 
benefits primarily to those people who have not accumulated 
enough money in their individual accounts to provide them 
with an adequate retirement income.  
In practice, most solidarity systems pay a basic benefit to all 
retirees – although they may provide additional benefits to 
those retirees with no other sources of income. In the United 
States, for example, the Social Security system pays special 
benefits to elderly people with no work experience. Most 
solidarity systems calculate benefits based on past years of 
work and wages, but set a maximum benefit so that very high 
income people do not receive very high benefits – allowing 
the system to redistribute money from high wage contribu'
tors to low wage beneficiaries. The maximum benefit in most 
countries is an indirect result of a wage cap. Usually, contri'
butions are only required on wages up to a maximum limit. 
This same limit is then used when calculating benefits. 
For some people, particularly those who earn high wages and 
want to maintain their standard of living after retirement, the 
combination of benefits from the solidarity system and the 
mandatory accumulation system may not provide enough 
savings. For these people, a third type of pension program is 
often provided: a voluntary accumulation system that allows 
people to pay into individual accounts and withdraw the 
money (plus accumulated investment income) after retire'
ment. 
The overall result is often referred to as a “three'pillar” pen'
sion system: a solidarity system that meets the goal of protect'
ing the elderly from poverty; a mandatory accumulation sys'
tem that ensures working people will receive additional pen'
sion benefits after retirement, and a voluntary private pen'
sion system for people who want even higher incomes after 
retirement and can afford to pay higher contributions during 
their working lives. 
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However, not all countries have taken this approach to pen'
sion reform. Some have tried to eliminate their solidarity sys'
tems entirely. The first country to attempt full privatisation of 
its pension system was Chile, in . It created a mandatory 
accumulation system in which funds were managed by private 
pension funds. The Chilean approach has won many sup'
porters throughout the world. At the same time, almost all 
Central and Eastern European countries have reformed their 
pension systems, choosing to introduce some version of the 
three'pillar system.  
Perhaps the overriding lesson from the experience accumu'
lated to date, is that the process of implementing a radical 
restructuring of the pension system is more difficult than it 
may first appear. Those countries that have failed to put in 
place the right administrative and regulatory infrastructures, 
and failed to pay careful attention to the financing of transi'
tion costs, are all suffering from severe growing pains. 
Current state of pension reform  
in Ukraine 
In April , Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma ap'
proved the “Basic Policy on Pension System Reform in 
Ukraine”, supporting the retention of part of the solidarity 
system, to provide basic benefits (the first pillar); a manda'
tory accumulation system, under which people are required 
to contribute to individual accounts (the second pillar); and a 
voluntary private system through which people who can af'
ford to, may save (the third pillar).  
Of course, the relative size and strength of the three pillars 
must depend on the prevailing economic and fiscal condi'
tions. In Ukraine, with its very low average wage and chronic 
national budget deficits, fighting severe poverty among the 
elderly must take priority over providing savings opportuni'
ties to the relatively few well'paid workers – at least, today. 
Therefore, the solidarity system will be larger than any man'
                                                                
 For a description of the Chilean experience with pension reform, 
see L. Jacobo Rodriguez, “Chile’s Private Pension System at : Its 
Current State and Future Challenges,” Report No. , The Cato 
Institute Project on Social Security Privatisation, Washington DC, 
July , . 
 See “The Central and Eastern European Experience with Pension 
Reform,” PADCO Pension Policy Report No. XX, January . 
In , President Ku*
chma approved the “Ba*
sic Policy on Pension 
System Reform in 
Ukraine”. The policy 
envisages creation of a 
three*pillar pension sys*
tem in Ukraine. To estab*
lish the new system, the 
government has already 
developed two draft laws. 
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datory or voluntary savings system in Ukraine for many years 
to come. The savings component of the pension system will 
grow as real wages grow. 
To implement this three pillar system – which the World 
Bank has endorsed as an approach that meets the needs of 
most countries – the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has de'
veloped two draft laws: “On mandatory state pension insur'
ance” and “On non'government pension programs”.  
The draft Law “On mandatory state pension insurance” was 
submitted by the government to the Verkhovna Rada in Au'
gust . 
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Evaluating the performance of 
Ukraine’s present pension system 
Under the present legal structure, and allowing for modest increases in maxi!
mum and minimum pensions, the Pension Fund of Ukraine will be in actuarial 
balance over the next  years. However, despite the favourable financial pro!
jections, the present system fails to meet basic criteria of a good pension system. 
This failure is caused by a number of problems within the system, including low 
retirement age, low and inadequate pension benefits, excessive number of privi!
leged pensioners, etc. Many of these problems are to be resolved by the new draft 
Law. 
Basic assumptions of the analysis 
Any projections of pension benefit payments and revenues to 
the Pension Fund depend on making assumptions about 
what will happen to the Ukrainian economy and population 
in the future. Every effort has been made to make the as'
sumptions as accurate as possible, and to ensure that the rela'
tionships among the assumptions are reasonable. However, 
as the tumultuous events of the past decade demonstrate, any 
assumptions about the future may turn out to be mistaken. 
Nevertheless, without making assumptions, projections are 
impossible and policymakers would be condemned to make 
decisions without any information at all.  
It is also important to remember that projections are not 
prepared just once (during the preparation of draft laws, for 
example). Each year, or even more frequently, projections 
must be updated by comparing actual results with what was 
expected and, if necessary, underlying assumptions must be 
modified. This ongoing process should be the responsibility 
of an Office of the Actuary within the government.  
                                                                
 Appendix B provides some important indicators of the economic 
situation and the pension system in Ukraine over the past years. As 
well, see Appendix C for detailed information on the present pen'
sion system of Ukraine. 
 For a detailed methodology and data sources of the analysis, see 
Appendix D. 
Projections of pension 
benefit payments and 
revenues to the Pension 
Fund depend on making 
assumptions about what 
will happen to the 
Ukrainian economy and 
population in the future. 
To keep the projections as 
accurate as possible, these 
assumptions must be 
updated regularly as new 
data becomes available. 
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Actuaries are experts in insurance and pension mathematics, 
and are responsible for financial analysis of pension systems 
throughout the world. All national social security systems in 
the West have an Office of the Actuary, and it is responsible 
for analysing the financial status of the pension system and 
recommending changes to keep it in actuarial balance. 
The economic scenario 
The state of the economy has immediate and large impacts 
on the revenues flowing into the pension system. The basic 
macroeconomic statistics used for this analysis were prepared 
by ICPS as its estimate of the most reasonable economic sce'
nario and are summarised in the table below.  
Table . Macroeconomic scenario  
(percent annual changes in key variables) 
Year             '
 
'
 
'
 
Real GDP '. . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 
Real wage '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Source: The economic scenario was developed for this analysis by ICPS.  
This pattern is consistent with the growth rates for transi'
tional, post'socialist economies in Eastern Europe – although 
with more modest growth rates for real GDP and real wages 
than in Poland or Hungary, for example, because of 
Ukraine’s slower pace of economic reform.  
Real wages are assumed to begin to grow in , but to re'
main at or below GDP growth from  through . Only 
in  do real wages begin to grow more rapidly than real 
GDP – reflecting the productivity gains expected as unprofit'
able state enterprises are liquidated or modernised and the 
workforce becomes more productive. 
The demographic scenario 
While the economy is a major factor in determining revenues 
to the pension system, the size and age of the population is 
the major determinant of the size of the labour force and the 
relative number of children and retirees to workers. Chart  
below shows the population projections for Ukraine for the 
next  years. The overall population is expected to decrease 
by more than % over this period. 
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Chart . Population 
thousands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
Year
    Female
    Male
The size of the population is affected by: 
• the number of babies born each year; 
• the number of deaths each year; 
• the number of people moving into or out of Ukraine. 
NUMBER OF BABIES BORN EACH YEAR. This is determined by 
the number of women of childbearing age and the fertility 
rate – the number of babies born to a woman during her life'
time. The fertility rate varies significantly by country and over 
time. In Ukraine today, the fertility rate of . children is at 
its lowest level in history. Any fertility rate below . obviously 
leads to a decline in the population, since couples are then 
failing to replace themselves. In the s and s, 
Ukraine’s fertility rate exceeded . and the population grew. 
But with deteriorating economic conditions and the easy 
availability of abortions, the birth rate has declined. Most 
Ukrainians simply cannot afford to raise children.  
However, as economic conditions improve, many demogra'
phers expect the fertility rate to increase from its current 
level of . to about .. Even so, this will not be enough to 
prevent the population from continuing to shrink. Paradoxi'
cally, as economic conditions improve, the birth rate will not 
return to its level in the s. In rich countries, high income 
families remain small because the opportunity cost of having 
children – in terms of lost income to women remaining at 
home caring for children – is higher.  
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NUMBER OF DEATHS EACH YEAR. Today, by worldwide stan'
dards Ukraine suffers from high mortality rates—the result of 
a decline in the quality of health care, stress caused by 
wrenching economic and social changes, and the overall de'
cline in the standard of living. Life expectancy at birth is 
about  years for males and  years for females, a result of 
the high mortality rates among babies and small children.  
A Ukrainian female who lives to the pension age, however, 
can expect to live for another . years; a man who lives to 
be  can expect to live a further . years. Consequently, 
those who survive to pension age can expect to live consid'
erably longer, though still less than in the United States or 
Western Europe.  
Over time, mortality rates will fall. But because the popula'
tion is ageing and fertility rates are low, the crude death rate 
(number of deaths per , members of the population) 
should continue to exceed the crude birth rate, resulting in a 
declining population. 
NET MIGRATION (PEOPLE MOVING INTO OR OUT OF UKRAINE). 
Since independence, many people have left Ukraine seeking 
better economic conditions in the USA, Canada, Germany, 
or Israel. Some Tatars, on the other hand, have returned 
from Central Asia to their homeland in Crimea. Still, there 
has been a net loss from out'migration. Many demographers 
expect Ukraine to have more immigration than emigration in 
the future, as people from poorer parts of the former Soviet 
Union, particularly from Central Asia, come to Ukraine seek'
ing a better life (this trend was observed in Ukraine during 
Soviet times). However, even if net immigration occurs, it is 
unlikely to reverse the overall population decline. 
Financial sustainability of the Pension 
Fund 
Number of people working and the number  
of contributors 
The ageing of the population over the next  years, shown in 
Chart  below, will mean a growing number of pensioners 
                                                                
 The projections in this report do not examine the pension systems 
from the perspective of different groups of workers and pensioners. 
This is an important perspective and should be the subject of de'
tailed study in the coming months, as the draft law is debated. 
Under the present legal 
structure, the Pension 
Fund of Ukraine will be 
in actuarial balance over 
the next  years and 
will show an overall sur*
plus. This balance is 
achieved at the expense of 
a falling ratio of average 
pensions to average 
wages over time and, in 
the immediate future, of 
continued low pension 
benefits. 
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relative to the active workforce. For purposes of this chart, 
the number of retirees in the population is projected by as'
suming that all women will retire at  and all men at . The 
population that may work includes all people between the 
ages of  and pension age. The area at the base of each col'
umn shows the number of children – those between ages zero 
and fourteen. After the year , the number of retirees be'
gins to increase as a percentage of the population, while the 
number of workers declines. This graphically illustrates the 
demographic problem that will be especially severe in 
Ukraine between  and . 
Chart . Age distribution of the population 
% 











          
Year
   '     ' Ret. Age   Ret. Age +
In general, younger people tend to work less than people be'
tween the ages of  and , when most able'bodied citizens 
are either working or looking for work (with the exception of 
the disabled or those who have given up hope of finding em'
ployment). After the age of  for women and  for men, the 
share of the working age group declines, as people retire. 
Current labour force participation rates – the percentage of 
citizens of a particular age who are available to work—are 
shown in Table . 
However, these figures determine only the labour force – the 
number of individuals available to work—and not the actual 
number employed. To estimate the number employed each 
year, the labour force must be reduced by the number of un'
employed. Unemployment tends to vary significantly by age, 
with greater unemployment at younger ages and less at older 
ages. Adjusting the labour force for unemployment yields the 
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number employed in the formal and the shadow economies 
combined.  
Table . Labour force participation rates,  
Age group Male Female 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
– .% .% 
+ .% .% 
How many workers will actually pay contributions to the Pen'
sion Fund? This is equal to the number employed less the 
number of those who are not required by law to contribute 
(such as career military officers) and those in the shadow 
economy (who do not pay required taxes or payroll contribu'
tions). Chart  below shows the projections for labour force, 
the number employed, and the number of those who actually 
contribute. 
Chart . Labour force statistics 
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For this analysis, we assume no net shift from the informal to 
the formal economy during the 'year projection period. 
Therefore, the ratio of contributors to workers stays constant. 
However, the relationship between the number of workers 
and the labour force varies as unemployment rates change. 
Calculating the number of contributors is complex. Unfortu'
nately, the Pension Fund does not know how many contribu'
tors there are, because employers pay contributions based on 
total wages, not on behalf of each employee. This practice is 
changing this year, through the creation of a personified re'
porting system that will allow the Pension Fund to record 
wages, contributions, and service credits for each employee. 
Once this system and related databases are fully imple'
mented, more accurate information about contributors will 
be available.  
Despite the lack of information regarding the number of 
contributors, the Pension Fund does have accurate informa'
tion on the total wage fund of all contributors. Information 
on the national average wage is available from the State 
Committee for Statistics. This is the average wage for workers 
in the formal sector working more than % of a standard 
schedule. Dividing the wage fund by the average wage yields 
the number of contributors, assuming everyone works full'
time. Since many contributions to the Pension Fund come 
from part'time workers, the actual number of contributors 
may be higher. However, if the model calculated a greater 
number of contributors, the national average wage would 
have to be adjusted downward to compensate. In either case, 
the total projected wage fund and contributions to the Pen'
sion Fund would be the same.  
The number of contributors shown above also includes about 
. million agricultural workers. These are excluded from the 
official wage fund statistics produced by the State Committee 
for Statistics, because agricultural workers pay a flat contribu'
tion and not a payroll'related contribution. We have included 
them among contributors, however, because the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy has informed us that agricultural 
enterprises will again be required to make payroll'based con'
tributions beginning in .  
                                                                
 See “Personifying Enterprise Reporting to the Pension Fund of 
Ukraine,” Roger Vaughan and Mikhail Muchnik, Labour Aspects, 
January . 
Pension reform 
Policy Studies, October  
Number of beneficiaries 
The total number of Ukrainians entitled to receive pension 
benefits each year is projected by subtracting the number of 
pensioners dying each year from the number of beneficiaries 
receiving payments in  and then adding the number of 
new pensioners in each year. The number of new pensioners 
is a function of the pension law, which stipulates pension ages 
and other eligibility criteria, and of how the population re'
sponds to general economic conditions.  
Chart . New old*age pensioners 
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Our pension model assumes the number of people in each 
age group who are retired as a percent of the population re'
mains constant over time. It projects the total number of pen'
sioners – which tends to be far more stable than the number 
of new pensioners – and then it is possible to calculate the 
number of new retirees each year. Chart  above shows the 
pattern of new old'age retirements during the 'year period. 
During the next five years, the number of new old'age pen'
sioners will decline because of the low number of births dur'
ing the Second World War. Following the war, birth rates 
slowly increased, reaching their highest levels between  
and the early s. The children born in this period will re'
tire between  and . Following the economic decline 
that began in the late s, however, birth rates fell rapidly, 
which will be reflected in a smaller number of new retirees at 
the end of the projection period.  
Pension reform 
Policy Studies, October   
Another factor affecting the number of beneficiaries is the 
government’s plan to move social pensions (and other types 
of social payments) back to the State Budget by the end of 
. In fact, starting this year, the State Budget began reim'
bursing the Pension Fund for payments to social pensioners. 
This will reduce the number of beneficiaries, because there 
will be no payments to social pensioners from the Pension 
Fund. Chart  below shows the distribution of beneficiaries 
by type of pension for the next  years. 
Chart . Distribution of pensioners by type 
thousands 









          
Year
Social Pensions               
Survivor Pensioners      
Disabled Pensioners     
Old Age Pensioners      
The net result of all these influences is that the projected 
number of pensioners will rise sharply until about , 
reaching a peak of almost  million, and then begin to de'
cline. However, the percentage distribution of pensioners by 
type will not change much throughout the 'year period, 
because we assume eligibility conditions for all types of pen'
sions will not change. 
Dependency ratios – combining contributor and 
beneficiary data 
One of the critical factors for any pension program is the de'
pendency ratio. In reality, there are two types of dependency 
ratios: 
• Population dependency ratio. This is the overall ratio of the 
share of the population over retirement age specified in 
the law to the portion of the population of working age. It 
shows the theoretical ratio of the number of retirees who 
must be supported by each worker. The lower the ratio, 
the more workers there are to support each pensioner. 
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Ukraine will suffer from an increase in this ratio, as will 
other developed countries. This ratio will increase from 
.% in  to .% by . 
• System dependency ratio. This is the ratio of actual pensioners 
to workers paying contributions, and can be very different 
from the population dependency ratio. The system de'
pendency ratio in Ukraine is higher than the population 
dependency ratio because many people are permitted to 
retire earlier than the standard retirement ages in the law, 
because of the large number of disabled pensioners and 
people receiving survivors’ pensions, and because many 
potential contributors are unemployed, disabled, stu'
dents, or evading contributions by working in the shadow 
economy. This ratio is projected to increase from .% 
in  to .% in . 
Chart  below shows the relationship between the number of 
contributors and the number of beneficiaries in the Ukrain'
ian pension system. 
As can be seen, the number of contributors exceeds the 
number of beneficiaries until , when an important statis'
tical event occurs: the number of pensioners begins to exceed 
the number of contributors. After that, Ukraine’s pension 
system suffers its worst demographic period, with the number 
of beneficiaries peaking in  while the number of con'
tributors continues declining. However, toward , the gap 
between the number of beneficiaries and the number of con'
tributors narrows.  
Chart . Contributors and beneficiaries 
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Payroll contributions 
The actual contributions to the Pension Fund each year must 
be projected from projections of the number of contributors. 
Revenues to the Pension Fund are a function of the number 
of contributors, their average wage, the contribution rate, the 
wage cap on contributions (the maximum amount of wages 
upon which pension contributions must be paid), and the 
rate of compliance in paying contributions. Adjustments 
must also be made for certain workers – those who are self'
employed, for example – who pay a flat contribution rather 
than a payroll contribution. 
For , the average wage for employees working full'time 
in the formal sector is projected to be . hryvnias (in'
cluding both agricultural and non'agricultural workers). The 
payroll contribution rate is % for employers, and either % 
or % of wages for employees. Those earning over  
hryvnias per month pay % of wages as a pension contribu'
tion, while those earning less pay %. The wage cap of , 
hryvnias per month means workers earning more than , 
hryvnias pay contributions only on the first , hryvnias. 
Underpayment by contributors is more difficult to assess, but 
there is little question that many employers deliberately un'
derreport the true wages of employees. Some estimates indi'
cate that this reduces total Pension Fund contributions by up 
to %. Also, the average wage on which pension contribu'
tions are based is lower than the average wage reported 
above, because contributions are paid on behalf of many part'
time workers, whose wages are not included in the calcula'
tion of the official average wage. The wage fund of contribu'
tors and the expected payroll contributions to the Pension 
Fund for selected years are projected to be: 
Table . Wage fund and payroll contributions 
billions hryvnias 
Year            
Wage Fund . . . . . . ,. ,. ,. ,. ,.
Payroll Con'
tributions 
. . . . . . . . ,. ,. ,. 
Payroll contributions comprise the majority of Pension Fund 
revenues, but it also receives revenues from other sources, 
including excise taxes on purchases of automobiles, jewel'
lery, currency transactions, and other luxury items, reim'
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bursements from the United Nations, voluntary contribu'
tions by employers and individuals, and reimbursements re'
ceived from employers for privileged pension payments 
made by the Pension Fund of Ukraine. These additional 
sources raise revenues by about .%. It should also be noted 
that the agricultural flat contribution produces less revenue 
than would have been received from a payroll contribution. 
Between now and , this results in a reduction of about 
.% in expected Pension Fund revenues. 
When projecting Pension Fund revenues, the most important 
factors are changes in the number of contributors and the 
growth rate of real wages. The number of contributors will 
decline over the next  years, reducing contributions to the 
Pension Fund. Offsetting this are inflation and the growth of 
real wages. If wages were to increase only because of inflation, 
contributions would increase each year in nominal terms but 
not in real terms. We assume, however, that real wages will 
grow, causing a real increase in contributions. The decline in 
contributions relative to benefit payments, therefore, will not 
be as severe as predicted by the rising pension system de'
pendency ratio.  
Average benefits and replacement ratios 
The next step is to determine total Pension Fund of Ukraine 
expenditures. Most expenditures are benefit payments to 
pensioners. For existing pensioners, the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Policy reports average and total benefits for differ'
ent types of pensioners in Report Number . This data also 
shows average and total benefits paid to those who retired in 
the past year.  
Benefit payments to today’s pensioners will decrease as pen'
sioners die, but will increase because pensions are indexed to 
inflation. Pensions are supposed to be raised when the CPI 
(the usual measure of inflation) has grown by % since the 
last adjustment. The government, however, has been using a 
procedure that indexes for less than full inflation since the 
beginning of . Based on our conversations with them, we 
have assumed that this procedure will continue for  and 
, and then return to the standard method. 
We assume initial benefits paid to new retirees will be at the 
same percentage of average wages as for existing retirees. 
This is .% for old'age retirees (. hryvnias divided by 
the average wage of . hryvnias). This implicitly assumes 
that the government adjusts maximum and minimum pen'
sions in proportion to the increase in average wage. There 
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were, for example, increases in the minimum and maximum 
pension benefits, such as the recent increase effective Sep'
tember , . Although normative acts do not specify this 
adjustment, it seems a reasonable projection of how the sys'
tem will operate in reality. 
Pension Fund expenditures will also be reduced by the shift 
of most social assistance payments to the national budget by 
the end of . This includes pension supplements, some 
targeted assistance payments, certain privileged pension 
payments, childcare allowances, funeral allowances, etc. The 
projections reported below adjust for all these factors. 
One useful but somewhat misleading way to look at pension 
benefits is to calculate the average replacement ratio for the 
entire pension system—the average benefits of all pensioners 
compared with the average wage in the economy. In coun'
tries like Ukraine that index benefits after retirement to 
changes in the CPI, this ratio will tend to decline as real 
wages grow. Average wages will increase faster than inflation, 
because labour productivity will improve. But we assume that 
new retirees will receive a pension at retirement that reflects 
these increases; therefore, their initial pension benefits will 
be a higher percentage of the average wage than those of ex'
isting retirees. Chart  below shows the changes in the aver'
age replacement ratio over time for the current Ukrainian 
pension system. 
Chart . Ratio: Average pension to average wage 
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Until , the average replacement ratio declines sharply 
because of the assumed rapid growth of real wages, and be'
cause the low number of new retirees during the next  or 
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 years means that fewer people will be entering the pen'
sioner population with initial higher pensions. After this 
date, the average replacement ratio improves as real wages 
grow more slowly and the number of new pensioners with 
higher initial pensions grows. The overall replacement ratio 
eventually stabilises at about % by . This is still a low 
replacement rate by the standards of most countries and will 
create pressure on the government to find ways to raise pen'
sions relative to wages. However, while today’s .% re'
placement ratio is well below the minimum consumption 
level, by  the % replacement ratio exceeds the mini'
mum consumption level. Therefore, the % benefit in  
is actually a far more adequate pension than the .% ratio 
is today. This assumes the minimum consumption level grows 
with inflation, while the average wage grows more rapidly due 
to productivity increases. As we shall see below, there are only 
three primary ways that the solidarity system can afford to 
make large increases in real pensions – by raising the pension 
age, by eliminating privileged retirements, and by collecting 
contributions from a larger number of working people. 
Pension Fund surplus and reserves 
The last step is to combine projections of contributions and 
benefit payments, to give an accurate financial picture of 
what will happen to the current Ukrainian pension system as 
the economy develops and as the demographic forces change 
the ratio of pensioners to workers. When revenues exceed 
expenditures, the Fund will enjoy a surplus. When expendi'
tures exceed revenues, it will suffer a deficit. The table below 
shows the surplus or deficit for selected years, and the accu'
mulated net surplus, or “reserve”, for the pension system. 
The reserve is projected as the accumulated “account bal'
ance”, assuming surpluses are deposited in a bank account 
each year and deficits are paid from this bank account. Each 
year, the account is credited with interest on its net reserves 
equal to the inflation rate. If there is a positive balance at the 
end of the 'year period, then the system is in actuarial bal'
ance. If there is a deficit, then it is not in balance. 
Table . Pension Fund balance and reserves 
millions hryvnias 
Year            
Surplus/ 
(Deficit) 
(.) (.) . . . . . . . . . 
Reserve   . . . , , , , , , 
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These projections show that the pension system will have a 
deficit from now until the end of . Thereafter, the pen'
sion system will be in surplus, and will accumulate significant 
reserves. Surpluses are particularly high from  through 
about , but shrink after that date. However, it remains 
positive throughout the 'year period, and at the end there 
is a surplus of more than % of GDP. This is good news for 
the government of Ukraine, because it indicates that the 
money can be used to either increase benefits, decrease con'
tributions to the solidarity system, or divert money to a man'
datory accumulation system. Chart  below shows the situa'
tion a different way. Revenues and expenditures are ex'
pressed as a percentage of each year’s projected GDP, show'
ing the pattern of surpluses and deficits in selected years dur'
ing the 'year period. 
Chart . Pension Fund revenues  
and expenditures 
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Why does the Pension Fund show an overall  
surplus? 
Since the Pension Fund has run a deficit for each of the past 
four years and until recently suffered a chronic problem with 
arrears, the projection of a surplus seems inconsistent. In ad'
dition, GDP and real wages have been declining for many 
years, and many enterprises are unable to pay their workers’ 
wages or the Pension Fund on time. The solidarity system 
appears broken beyond repair. But this view of the financial 
condition of the Pension Fund overlooks the fact that its 
problems are the result, in large part, of the government’s 
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policy of forcing the Pension Fund to pay social assistance 
benefits while failing to reimburse it for other payments it 
makes on behalf of the state budget.  
Fortunately, the Pension Fund is about to enter a period of 
more favourable demographic and economic conditions that 
could assure a sound financial basis for the Pension Fund for 
many years to come. The primary reasons for the more fa'
vourable outlook in the next few years are the smaller num'
ber of new retirees, the anticipated decline in the number of 
disabled male war veterans and survivors of men killed in ac'
tion during the Second World War, and the long'expected 
economic renewal. In addition, inflation indexing rather 
than wage indexing of pensions will allow contributions to 
grow faster than pension payments. The maximum benefit 
cap, even with annual wage indexing, will keep the maximum 
replacement ratio at % and the average at .% for each 
year’s new retirees.  
The current level of contributions is more than sufficient to 
support an average replacement ratio of % in the near fu'
ture. Based on world'wide standards, this is not an unreason'
able benefit level for a solidarity system. But this average con'
ceals two disturbing facts. First, because of Ukraine’s very low 
real wages in comparison with other countries, a replacement 
rate of % does not provide the average pensioner with 
enough income to avoid severe poverty. Second, pension 
benefits are not related to past wages because of the cap on 
maximum pensions. Pensioners who worked in low'paid jobs 
prior to retirement receive pensions that exceed % of their 
wages prior to retirement, while workers who had been in 
higher paid jobs prior to retirement may receive pensions 
barely equal to % of their wages. Certain groups of privi'
leged pensioners receive even higher benefits, either because 
the maximum benefit cap is higher than for other workers, or 
does not apply to them at all. As real wages grow, therefore, 
more and more workers will become dissatisfied with the 
solidarity system.  
Problems with the current pension 
system 
Despite the favourable financial projections for the current 
system, maintaining the current pension system unchanged is 
not an option. The present solidarity system fails to meet the 
following conditions: 
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• It must provide adequate minimum benefits – relative to the pov*
erty level. This requires a reasonable benefit formula in the 
solidarity system that protects the most vulnerable groups 
in society while at the same time provides acceptable 
benefits to the highly paid.  
• It must provide reasonable benefits relative to the contributions 
people pay. People paying large contributions should re'
ceive high benefits, and those who make the same contri'
butions should get equivalent benefits from the national 
pension system. If certain professions or groups need to 
receive better benefits, this must be financed outside the 
national pension system. 
• The system must be fiscally sustainable for the government in the 
short and long term. Although the present system is fiscally 
solvent, it would not solvent if reasonable benefits were 
paid.  
• Administrative systems should be efficient – both in terms of col*
lecting and distributing benefits and in minimising wastage, 
fraud, and abuse. Efficient administration requires modern 
computer and communications systems to streamline re'
porting, and to maintain accurate records, provide 
needed management information, allow efficient auditing 
of records and benefit calculations, and encourage volun'
tary compliance with contribution requirements. Al'
though the Pension Fund has begun a program of per'
sonified reporting, there is much additional work to be 
done. 
• The legal framework must support a sustainable system that does 
not require frequent amendments. Currently, there are many 
changes in components of the system being made each 
year, and the government lacks the financial resources to 
comply with existing law.  
The present system’s failure to meet these conditions is 
caused by a number of problems, which are briefly discussed 
below. 
Retirement ages are too low 
By international standards, Ukraine provides pensions at a 
very low age. Life expectancy at age  for males is . years 
and for females at age  is . years. Consequently, life ex'
pectancy following retirement is significant. Decreases in 
mortality, leading to longer payment periods following re'
tirement, can be expected. Low retirement ages hurt the pen'
Despite the favourable 
financial projections, 
maintaining the current 
pension system un*
changed is not an option, 
since the system fails to 
meet basic criteria for a 
good pension system. 
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sion system in two ways. Pensioners receive benefit payments 
for a longer period of time, and they also make contributions 
for a shorter period of time. For women, the expected num'
ber of years of payments is only slightly shorter than the ex'
pected period of contributions. In order to improve benefits 
or divert contributions to a mandatory accumulation system, 
retirement ages must be increased. This will be a difficult 
change to implement because people are used to being able 
to receive pensions at a relatively young age. But there is no 
better way of increasing the proportion of people paying into 
the system to people receiving benefits from the system than 
raising the retirement age.  
It will be important to explain to the public why it is necessary 
to increase pension ages. This means explaining the basic fact 
that there are more people over the age of  today (as a per'
cent of the population) than there were ten years ago – and 
that this ratio will get progressively larger over the next  
years. This explanation should include estimates of how 
much pensions can be increased today if pension ages are 
increased. It will also be important to introduce the increase 
in pension ages gradually, so that people nearing pension age 
are not suddenly denied pensions.  
If, for example, pension ages were  for both men and 
women, old'age pension benefits would be able to be in'
creased by  percent and the system would still be in the same 
financial condition as currently.  
Too many workers receive privileged pensions 
As a poor country, Ukraine cannot afford to offer privileged 
pensions to so many members of its workforce. Privileged 
retirements cause many problems. Currently, privileged pen'
sioners have higher average pensions and begin receiving 
pensions at an earlier age. In , there were . million old'
age pensioners with an average benefit of . hryvnias, and 
. million privileged pensioners with an average benefit of 
. hryvnias. In addition, privileged pensioners are, on 
average, six years younger than ordinary old'age pensioners. 
Consequently, costs for this group are much higher than for 
other workers. Ordinary workers perceive the pension system 
as inequitable, since everyone contributes the same percent 
of their wages in pension contributions, but some workers get 
vastly better benefits. Either everyone must pay the same con'
tribution rate and receive the same benefit, or those who re'
ceive greater benefits must pay more while they work.  
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This does not mean that certain professions do not need an 
earlier retirement age, but any increased benefits should not 
be financed through the national pension system. Instead, 
they should be paid by employers or through the state 
budget. Otherwise the solidarity system will be inequitable, 
and compliance will suffer. 
Highly paid workers receive disproportionately 
small pensions 
The current pension system gives much higher benefits as a 
percentage of pay to low'paid workers than to highly paid 
workers, even though both may have contributed the same 
percentage of wages throughout their working career (unless 
they were among the very small minority that were subject to 
the contribution cap).  
The benefit formula for the current pension system promises 
a benefit of % of prior wages for a man with  years of ser'
vice credits or a woman with  years of service credits. In 
reality, however, the lower'paid get the % benefit and, be'
cause of the maximum benefit limit, highly paid workers re'
ceive a much lower benefit as a percentage of pay. A worker 
earning . hryvnias per month (the average pay in ) 
gets a % replacement ratio (maximum benefit of . 
hryvnias), while a worker earning three times the average 
wage receives a replacement ratio of only .% of pay and a 
worker earning , hryvnias per month (the pay cap) re'
ceives a benefit of only .% of pay. Consequently, the cur'
rent structure encourages the higher paid to evade. The “rate 
of return” on contributions made by the higher paid is ex'
tremely poor. Contributions are very high, and benefits are 
very low. Compliance will never improve if this is not cor'
rected. 
Reporting systems encourage fraud  
or misrepresentation of work experience 
A related problem is that the current pension system relates 
benefits and contributions poorly. Not only do higher paid 
workers receive low relative benefits compared to the amount 
contributed, but also many people receive pensions while 
making minimal contributions. The system of workbooks is 
part of the problem. Employees can leave their workbooks 
with employers, receiving service credits, without actually 
contributing to the Pension Fund. Fraudulent workbooks can 
also be purchased cheaply. Also, students, the unemployed, 
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mothers caring for children, and others with no incomes (at 
least no registered incomes) nevertheless receive service 
credits.  
In addition, the average monthly earnings used to calculate 
benefits are usually based only on the last two year’s wages, so 
there is little incentive to contribute (or to register wages ac'
curately) in other years. To make matters worse, employers 
often raise workers’ wages (at least in reports to the Pension 
Fund) in the last two years in order to give employees eligibil'
ity for higher pensions. Consequently, there is little incentive 
to contribute – either because benefits are totally inequitable 
in relation to contributions, or because it’s possible to get the 
same benefit without contributing. 
Disability retirement is granted too easily 
In most national pension systems, disability benefits are pro'
vided only to those with severe disabilities—those likely to be 
permanent, result in death, or demonstrably reduce workers’ 
future incomes. Occupational disabilities are typically paid 
through special programs outside the pension system. Less 
severe forms of disability are generally paid through private 
insurance programs or separate state programs funded 
through separate contributions. Active employer participa'
tion is usually encouraged to minimise the costs of such sys'
tems.  
Ukraine’s solidarity pension system, by contrast, offers dis'
ability benefits to those with far less serious disabilities. In 
fact, many disabled retirees are able to work. About % of 
all group' disability pensioners are working. The disability 
retirement program is being used, to a large extent, as an 
early retirement and unemployment program. Employers 
who can do so have employees classified as eligible for dis'
ability benefits, thereby avoiding payment of severance and 
other costs associated with reducing their workforces. 
In addition, the criteria for receiving benefits is often based 
on factors other than medical conditions. Benefits can be 
granted due to social or medical considerations. To make 
matters worse, the Pension Fund is financially responsible for 
disability payments but does not control the approval and 
review process. Consequently, there is little incentive for the 
Medical and Social Commission to deny disability requests, 
since it does not suffer the financial consequences of its deci'
sions. The entire structure of the disability program requires 
review. 
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The Pension Fund accepts in*kind contributions 
and even pays benefits comprising non*cash  
disbursements 
Some employers are permitted to make their required pay'
ments to the Pension Fund in the form of goods (known as 
“in'kind” contributions). Similarly, benefit payments to retir'
ees are often made in kind. Technically, pensioners can re'
fuse to accept in'kind payments, but in practice, their choice 
is often between receiving in'kind payments or no payments 
at all until some time in the future. Even worse is the system 
of bills of exchange (veksels), special securities issued by en'
terprises to pay for taxes and pension contributions that are 
accepted by the Pension Fund but sold at substantial dis'
counts in financial markets. The Pension Fund receives less 
than it is owed, and enterprises can continue operating even 
though their revenues are less than their costs.  
All contributions and benefit payments should be made only 
though proper cash payments or bank transfers. Any other 
system of payments allows contributors to escape from their 
full obligation and denies pensioners access to timely pay'
ment of the benefits due them. Pensioners should not have to 
sell goods at the roadside or at a market to get the money they 
are owed. The Pension Fund cannot act as a commodity bro'
ker, liquidating products that manufacturers cannot sell. 
Employers should sell their own products and contribute 
only cash to the Pension Fund. Anything else undermines 
citizen confidence in the pension system. 
All working people should pay the same  
contribution rate if they receive the same benefit 
Agricultural enterprises and the self'employed are both re'
quired to pay a flat contribution to the Treasury each year in 
full settlement of all tax and contribution obligations. The 
Treasury then allocates their payments to the various tax au'
thorities. These payments are far less than what would be re'
quired on a payroll contribution basis. For example, there 
are approximately . million workers at agricultural enter'
prises with total wages of about  billion hryvnias. Payroll 
contributions would be about  million hryvnias, while the 
portion of the agricultural flat contribution allocated to the 
Pension Fund is about  million hryvnias. Yet these work'
ers are still entitled to a benefit based on average monthly 
wages and service. This situation needs to be corrected. Ei'
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ther benefits and contributions should both be based on pay, 
or there should be both a flat contribution and a flat benefit. 
Pension Fund is not reimbursed properly 
The Pension Fund makes benefit payments on behalf of 
many entities – national and local governments, the Chorno'
byl Fund, the Employment Fund, and employers – for which 
it is supposed to be reimbursed. Often the reimbursements 
received are significantly less than the amounts paid. This 
creates losses for the Pension Fund that lead directly to 
greater pension arrears. Not only should the Pension Fund 
be fully reimbursed, all their distribution costs should be re'
imbursed as well. 
Paying too many social assistance benefits  
from the Pension Fund 
The Pension Fund is primarily an insurance Fund. People 
pay in while they are working and expect benefits when they 
retire. But the government currently requires the Pension 
Fund to use pension contributions to pay social assistance 
payments to people who never worked, or who worked for 
such short periods of time that their pension benefits are very 
low. These people receive social pensions (if they have no 
work credits) or targeted assistance payments (if they have 
few years of service credits or if their wages prior to retire'
ment were very small). The Pension Fund also pays supple'
ments to war veterans and others. This practice undermines 
the integrity of the pension insurance system, and also in'
creases benefit payments relative to contributions. 
In response to these problems, the government has already 
made important changes. Social payments will be transferred 
to the State Budget between now and the end of  – al'
though how the government will pay for this increased obli'
gation is not yet clear. Also, a personified reporting program 
has been established to create individual records for all 
workers—of wages, contributions, and service credits. These 
changes alone are important but not sufficient. Many of the 
problems with the current system are still unresolved. Conse'
quently, the government has proposed significant additional 
changes in the draft Law “On mandatory state pension insur'
ance”. This draft law would modify the existing solidarity sys'
tem and also establish a mandatory accumulation system. 
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Introducing a mandatory accumu)
lation system 
In August , the Government sent to the Verkhovna Rada the draft Law “On 
mandatory state pension insurance”. The law makes fundamental changes to the 
solidarity system – including raising the pension age, reforming the procedures 
for calculating benefits, and introducing a mandatory accumulation system. 
With all the changes in place, the solidarity system shows a smaller surplus due 
to the diversion of contributions into the mandatory accumulation system, while 
the ratios of contributors to beneficiaries and average pension to average wage 
are higher. Despite favourable projections, the mandatory accumulation system 
should be introduced only after the necessary preconditions are met. 
Reasons for introducing a mandatory 
accumulation system in Ukraine 
When the Government of Ukraine considered creating a 
mandatory accumulation system to supplement the present 
system, they considered five arguments – none of which, 
alone, is a sufficient condition for creating such a full priva'
tised pension system, and some of which may lead to entirely 
the wrong approach to the design of the accumulation sys'
tem: 
• To smooth over time fluctuations in contribution rates 
and benefits that demographic changes in the ratio of 
contributors to pensioners would cause in a pay'as'you'go 
system. This argues for pre'funding, which could be done 
with or without creating an accumulation system. 
• To privatise pension administration and/or asset man'
agement and to give to private companies some or all of 
the responsibility for the collection of pension revenues, 
investing reserves, or distributing pension benefits on the 
grounds that private enterprise performs these functions 
better than government agencies. But privatisation does 
not necessarily imply a system that is either mandatory or 
that requires full accumulation. 
• To force people to set aside money during their working 
lives so that they will not become dependent on govern'
ment benefits during their old age. This justifies a manda'
tory system, but not necessarily a fully funded system. 
The Government of 
Ukraine considered five 
major reasons for creat*
ing a mandatory accu*
mulation system. How*
ever, no one of reason 
considered by itself justi*
fies a fully privatised 
mandatory accumulation 
system. Nevertheless, a 
mandatory accumulation 
system is one way of meet*
ing all these goals at the 
same time. 
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• To reduce the influence of short'run political considera'
tions. When politicians want to increase pension benefits 
today, they usually create long'term financing problems. 
This justifies linking benefits to accumulated contribu'
tions – but not necessarily for complete funding of the sys'
tem. 
• To create increased savings to finance investments in eco'
nomic growth. 
These reasons are examined in turn in the following subsec'
tions. No reason, considered by itself, justifies a fully priva'
tised mandatory accumulation system. Nevertheless, a man'
datory accumulation system is one way of meeting all these 
goals at the same time. Many countries have found the com'
bination of reasons to be sufficiently compelling to create 
mandatory accumulation systems. The World Bank, in its 
 study of pension policy, has recommended that a man'
datory accumulation system be one of the three “pillars” (to'
gether with a solidarity system to ensure basic pension bene'
fits for the elderly and a voluntary private system) that sup'
port a healthy, balanced pension system.  
To smooth out fluctuations in contribution rates 
or in benefit levels over time 
A mandatory accumulation system can help solve long'term 
demographic problems experienced by pay'as'you'go systems. 
In many countries (and Ukraine is typical of many developing 
countries), the ratio of pensioners to workers—what is called 
“the system dependency ratio”—is increasing over time. The 
percentage of Ukraine’s population over the age of  is 
forecast to increase from .% in  to .% in , 
and to continue growing at an accelerated pace after that 
date. The fertility rate – number of children born on average 
to each woman between the age of  and  – is declining. It 
                                                                
 Countries that have created mandatory accumulation systems 
include the well'publicised system in Chile, created in  and 
recently copied (at least in part) in Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, 
and Peru. Accumulation systems have also been created in Poland 
and Hungary. 
 See Averting the Old Age Crisis: A World Bank Policy Research Report, 
Oxford University Press,  
 See United Nations, Human Development Report , New York, 
Oxford University Press, , Table . The comparable data for 
Ukraine are .% in  and .% in . 
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was . in  and has fallen to . today, although it is ex'
pected to increase to . by . Consequently, there will be 
fewer and fewer workers to support more and more pension'
ers, especially from about  to . 
One solution is to “pre'fund” a part of future benefit pay'
ments by collecting more money during times when the ratio 
of workers to pensioners is relatively high. The accumulated 
surplus (and the income it generates through investments) 
pays benefits in the future as the ratio of workers to pension'
ers falls.  
The alternatives to such pre'funding are either to raise the 
pension age so that the ratio of workers to pensioners does 
not decline as quickly, to reduce pension benefits as their 
numbers increase so that the burden on the shrinking work'
force is reduced, or to raise contribution rates from workers.  
Ukraine is seriously considering raising the pension age. This 
is the approach used in almost all developed countries. The 
United States, for example, also faces a decline in the ratio of 
workers to pensioners and has begun raising the pension age 
from  to  (for both men and women) in small incre'
ments. Ukraine is not in a position to further reduce its al'
ready low pension benefits or to raise its already very high 
contribution rate. Therefore, raising the pension age in 
Ukraine will improve the financial situation, but it will not 
provide enough money to allow for any significant increase in 
benefits.  
There are two reasonable sources for a rational “pre'funding” 
program: 
. Restructuring the solidarity system to increase compli'
ance rates among contributors, raise the efficiency of sys'
tem administration, eliminate fraud in benefit calcula'
tions, raise retirement ages, and eliminate expensive 
privileges; or  
. Divert into the “pre'funding program” one'time fiscal 
revenues from programs such as the privatisation of state 
assets, natural resource usage taxes, or some other tem'
porary source of increased general revenues to the state 
budget. 
Borrowing to pay for the new system makes no sense. If the 
government borrows to make the additional contributions 
today, no pre'funding has really occurred. This is clear when 
one views the problems of the government in the future. The 
government borrows today by issuing securities and invests 
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the money in the pre'funding program, it will face two groups 
of people wanting the money that has been accumulated: the 
people who loaned the government the money will want to be 
repaid, and pensioners will want to receive their pension 
benefits from the new accumulation system. The government 
will either have to say no to the pensioners and pay them 
from the solidarity system, or it will have to borrow even 
more money to repay the original bondholders. 
Another pitfall of “pre'funding” is investing all reserves in 
state securities. Unfortunately, if reserve funds are simply 
invested in state securities, no real pre'funding has occurred. 
The United States social security system lends reserves to the 
government by purchasing special state securities, earning a 
lower income than it could receive if it engaged in wider in'
vestments. The social security system is simply being used to 
lend money to the government at low rates. To earn higher 
rates of return, reserves should be invested by private asset 
managers where they can earn more investment income for 
future beneficiaries than is earned by investing in govern'
ment securities – and where investment decisions are not sub'
ject to influence by the government or the legislature. 
It is important to note that it is actually possible to “pre'fund” 
future benefit payments without creating a mandatory accu'
mulation system. A mandatory accumulation system is simply 
one way to do it. Reserves could simply be accumulated in the 
existing solidarity system and invested by the Treasury or 
some other government agency. Alternatively, private asset 
managers could invest reserves without those accumulations 
being allocated to individual accounts.  
However, the success of pre'funding depends on investing 
pre'funded reserves efficiently to ensure funds are properly 
protected from raids by the government or by the Parliament. 
Both typically view any funds set aside for the future as an 
attractive resource to distribute to voters today. A mandatory 
accumulation system is, however, a good way of putting the 
assets out of the reach of government officials and of Parlia'
ment, by giving individuals property rights over the money 
invested. This means the reserves are more likely to be in'
vested properly and to be available when they are needed.  
Privatising pension administration and/or asset 
management 
The second reason for considering an accumulation pension 
system is to transfer the primary responsibility for administer'
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ing the collection of contributions, the investment of pro'
ceeds, or the distribution of pension benefits from the gov'
ernment to the private sector. Under the state solidarity sys'
tem, the government monopolises all these functions. The 
growing worldwide volume of privatisation of activities that 
were formerly government monopolies – from telecommuni'
cations companies to water suppliers – attests to the fact that 
many governments are realising that there are operations the 
private sector performs better than the government. By creat'
ing competition among private companies to provide pen'
sion'related services, taking advantage of the private sector’s 
profit motive, and utilising efficient private capital markets to 
invest system reserves, overall costs will decrease and the 
overall efficiency and fairness of the pension system will in'
crease because this government service is now “privatised”. 
This is no different from deciding to privatise any other in'
dustry that was previously controlled by the government. 
Note that it is possible to privatise some functions of the pri'
vate pension system without privatising everything. For ex'
ample, in Bolivia, the government retains responsibility for 
collecting contributions, distributing benefits, and record 
keeping. However, the asset management is privatised 
through a tender process. In Poland, contributions are col'
lected by the government and then remitted to private pen'
sion funds. Asset management and benefit payment functions 
are performed by the private sector. For its private pension 
funds, Kazakhstan follows the Polish model. The govern'
ment, however, provides all services to people who select the 
state’s accumulation fund. 
Establishing a mandatory accumulation system reduces the 
government’s role in the economy. It allows citizens to 
choose how, and with whom, they wish to save their money 
for retirement. Individual citizens – not government bureau'
crats – are responsible for taking care of their own retirement 
savings. The government is responsible only for supplement'
ing the incomes of people who have not saved enough – be'
cause of prolonged unemployment, sickness, or other prob'
lems in the labour market. The government is also responsi'
ble for regulating the private pension industry to protect par'
ticipants’ rights. Government is no longer managing a huge 
social insurance program. It is primarily the provider of a 
much smaller social welfare program. Its role has changed 
from primary provider to regulator. 
Of course, the debate over whether to privatise the pension 
system becomes purely theoretical if the country lacks the 
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private capital markets, investment opportunities, and insti'
tutions to support a private pension system. This was, and is, 
the position of Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Responsibility can 
be transferred to the private sector only if the private sector 
exists, and if there is good reason to believe it can perform 
these roles better than government agencies could. Other'
wise, when the new and unsupported private pension system 
inevitably fails, the government will be forced to “re'
nationalise” the pension system at great financial expense. 
The government will be far worse off than it was before re'
form, because it will have all its old responsibilities back, plus 
the enormous cost of repaying the losses incurred in the 
failed privatisation. Ukraine cannot justify the creation of a 
mandatory accumulation system as the privatisation of the 
pension system because Ukraine lacks most of the building 
blocks of a private capital market.  
Forcing people to set aside money for their old age 
All governments provide assistance for poor people. This can 
create a problem by discouraging people from looking after 
themselves. If some people save money during their working 
lives and receive pensions from the incomes from their sav'
ings, they will not need – nor receive – any social assistance 
from the government. Other people, who spend all they earn 
while they are working, will need social assistance when they 
are old.  
By creating a mandatory accumulation system, therefore, the 
government can force citizens to save for their own retire'
ment. This is a necessary counterbalance to the incentive to'
ward irresponsible behaviour that the government social as'
sistance system provides. If the government were simply to 
reduce the level of pension benefits from the solidarity sys'
tem without introducing a mandatory accumulation system, 
many more elderly people would need to be provided with 
social assistance. The government would simply switch re'
sponsibility for financing social protection from its old'age 
pension system to its social assistance system.  
                                                                
 Kazakhstan was in the same position – actually, in a somewhat 
more favourable position than is Ukraine today. But it still lacked 
trustworthy financial institutions. Therefore, after it started 
privatisation, it was forced to re'nationalise through the State 
Accumulation Fund. Consequently, their privatisation was virtual, 
not real. 
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Western countries do not face such an acute problem in this 
regard as does Ukraine. It is possible for government pension 
programs to provide much lower pension benefit levels rela'
tive to average incomes than in Ukraine. The United States 
Social Security system, for example, provides an average 
benefit to retirees of only % of average income – below the 
% replacement rate in Ukraine today. But this low relative 
benefit level is about $ per month – far above the $ per 
month in Ukraine. In addition, most of those retiring in the 
US have substantial additional assets at retirement, primarily 
due to equity accumulated in private property and the ability 
to save safely in banks and other financial institutions, and 
because the poverty level is a much lower percentage of the 
average wage than in Ukraine. Few of the elderly in the US 
are poor and, therefore, there is no strong argument for forc'
ing them to save more through a mandatory accumulation 
system. In Ukraine, however, a much higher share of the eld'
erly will be poor unless required by law to save during their 
working lives. Consequently, there is a much stronger argu'
ment for a mandatory accumulation pension program in 
Ukraine than in the United States or in other Western coun'
tries.  
Depoliticise pension policy 
If the pension system is privatised, people will receive old'age 
pensions in an amount directly and transparently linked to 
what they contributed into the private pension funds during 
their working lives. Politicians would no be able longer prom'
ise to raise pensions today in exchange for votes – storing up 
fiscal problems for the future – because they would no longer 
control the pension system. This issue was vividly illustrated 
during the last Ukrainian Presidential election campaign, 
where just prior to the elections, some back wages and pen'
sions were paid, the minimum pension benefit was increased, 
and one billion hryvnias in emissions were issued by the Na'
tional Bank of Ukraine. 
Of course, none of these reasons necessarily justifies the crea'
tion of a mandatory accumulation system. Each goal can be 
met without creating a mandatory accumulation system. Pri'
vatisation and depoliticisation, for example, can be achieved 
by simply terminating the state solidarity system. Protecting 
the state from excessive welfare payments in the future can be 
achieved by maintaining the current solidarity system. And 
stabilising the balance between contributions and expendi'
tures is achieved through pre'funding. 
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Increasing the supply of money to investors 
Proponents of mandatory accumulation systems often make 
other arguments in favour of their introduction. They point 
out, for example, that the pool of savings available to finance 
economic development will be increased. But this is no justi'
fication for creating a mandatory system. Pension funds are 
created for pension beneficiaries – not for would'be inves'
tors. It is wrong to think that the pension system has a direct 
impact on promotion of savings and economic growth. Nu'
merous surveys have not proved the hypothesis that a pension 
system increases domestic savings. To increase domestic sav'
ings, Ukraine needs major reforms in its laws “On the taxa'
tion of physical persons” and “On the taxation of legal enti'
ties”, and—most important—safe and stable financial institu'
tions. To force people to save before establishing safe finan'
cial institutions is tantamount to stealing from working peo'
ple.  
Contributions to pension accounts are, after all, only one way 
to save. Other ways include depreciation allowances for busi'
nesses, private savings of households, retaining profits of en'
terprises, and surpluses in the State Budget or in social pro'
tection funds. Budget or fund deficits reduce gross savings.  
A mandatory accumulation system creates a sudden increase 
in the supply of savings. Some policymakers argue that 
Ukraine is so desperate for investment funds that it can easily 
invest this increase. Certainly, many people would be willing 
to invest other people’s money in various projects, but few of 
these investments would ever yield any returns for the unfor'
tunate pensioners. Investments must not be made on the ba'
sis of need, but on the basis of future returns – either repay'
ment, if the money is offered as a loan, or dividends, if the 
money is invested through the stock market. Forced savings 
do not stimulate economic growth, and may even lead to eva'
sion – especially for low'paid workers who may not have any 
discretionary income, and may need to choose between re'
tirement savings and food or heat. 
                                                                
 In Chile, for example, pension reform increased savings, but only 
because the government cut expenditures and money was used to 
finance different programs. This directly increased savings because 
the surplus of revenues to the budget over budget expenditure is a 
part of national savings. Savings in Chile began to grow in the 
middle of the s, but only after a great economic upheaval. 
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In fact, creating a pool of assets with no safe projects to invest 
in, and with no accepted procedures for making investments, 
creates many more problems than it solves. If pension assets 
are invested in government securities, rates of return may be 
so low that working people will be bitterly disappointed when 
they learn how small the pension is that they receive through 
the new pension system. The availability of a “captive” lender 
encourages the government to borrow money without proper 
consideration. If pension assets are invested in risky private 
projects, pensioners will also suffer losses. Today, there are 
simply not enough investment opportunities in Ukraine in 
which working people’s future pensions can be entrusted. 
But politicians resist the idea of allowing asset managers to 
invest through international capital markets. Too many gov'
ernment officials want to use pension assets to invest in their 
own favourite projects.  
Profile of the new law 
In August , the Government sent the draft Law “On 
mandatory state pension insurance” to the Verkhovna Rada. 
The new law makes some fundamental changes to the solidar'
ity system – including raising the pension age, reforming the 
procedures for calculating benefits, and introducing a man'
datory accumulation system. 
The proposed changes in the draft law include a number of 
items that will either increase revenues to the system or will 
reduce expenditures. These changes allow for significant in'
creases in benefits – thereby meeting the government’s ex'
press goal of re'establishing the link between wages and ser'
vice credits, and benefits.  
The following proposed measures will have an impact on 
revenues and expenditures of the system: 
• The statutory pension age will be raised to  for males 
and  for females. Pension ages will increase by  months 
in each 'month period until they reach the targeted ages. 
Early retirement with reduced pension benefits will be 
permitted at the current retirement ages. This has the 
largest financial impact of any of the revenue enhance'
ment/expenditure reduction measures.  
• Pension payments to privileged pensioners by the Pension 
Fund of Ukraine will be eliminated over time. Employers 
will be required to finance privileged pensions by making 
contributions to corporate or occupational pension 
schemes. Eventually, the balances in these funds will be 
In August , the 
Government sent the 
Law “On mandatory 
state pension insurance” 
to the Verkhovna Rada. 
The new law makes some 
fundamental changes to 
the solidarity system – 
including raising the 
pension age, reforming 
the procedures for calcu*
lating benefits, and in*
troducing a mandatory 
accumulation system. 
Pension reform 
Policy Studies, October  
sufficient to pay the privileged portion of the pension 
benefits. 
• The period used to calculate average monthly earnings at 
retirement will be increased to reach lifetime career wages 
by about . Past wages are indexed based on national 
average wages in the corresponding years. Personified re'
cords will be used, to the extent possible, in maintaining 
records and making these calculations. This will allow 
some cost savings, because it will encourage employers 
and workers to make contributions based on all pay in all 
years, and will also discourage the practice of artificially 
increasing wages just prior to retirement. 
• For the most part, service credits will be granted only for 
the years in which contributions are actually paid (a 
change made possible by the introduction of personified 
reporting). This should encourage better compliance in 
contribution payments – although it is difficult to predict 
how much additional contributions it will attract.  
• The minimum pension benefit is eliminated and pay'
ments to those with low pension benefits will be financed 
from the state budget. This will primarily affect disability, 
survivor, and social pensioners. Financing social pensions 
from the state budget has already been included in our 
projections, so this will have no impact. Eliminating the 
minimum benefit will have a minor impact on disability 
and survivor benefit payment projections. 
• The accrual rate per year of service will be reduced from 
the present level of .% per year for men (for the first  
years of service, % thereafter) and .% per year of ser'
vice for women (for the first  years, % thereafter) to 
.% for all years of service. The accrual percentage 
earned as of the date the law is amended will be preserved. 
• Disability retirement benefits will now be a percentage of 
the projected retirement benefit, rather than a percent of 
wages. This will slightly reduce the overall level of disabil'
ity benefits. 
• Set the wage cap on wages subject to contributions and 
used to calculate benefits equal to four times the average 
wage but not less than the current ,'hryvnia limit. 
This will effectively freeze the wage limit for a number of 
years, and then it will begin to increase each year. 
The measures that will increase pension benefits over time 
are: 
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• Index pension benefits at % of the rate of growth of 
wages, in addition to inflation indexing already included 
in the law. 
• Increase the maximum pension benefit each year by the 
increase in nominal wages plus % for each of the first  
years, and % thereafter until the maximum pension 
benefit has no impact on benefit calculations. 
• Beginning after certain economic and administrative pre'
conditions have been met, a portion of payroll contribu'
tions will be diverted from the solidarity system to a new 
mandatory accumulation system based on individual ac'
counts. The contribution will be no less than % and no 
more than % of wages. An actuarial certification of the 
affordable level of mandatory system contributions is re'
quired to allow the diversion of money to the new system. 
Fiscal analysis of the reformed  
solidarity system 
Contributors and beneficiaries 
Analysis of the reformed solidarity system is far more com'
plex than that of the current system. Of course, reforming 
the pension system has no impact on the overall population 
projections for Ukraine. However, it does significantly 
change the expected number of contributors and beneficiar'
ies. The increased retirement age both increases the size of 
the labour force and the number of contributors, and re'
duces the number of beneficiaries, thereby improving the 
financial conditions of the Pension Fund, as shown in the 
chart below. 
This is a very different picture than that provided by the cur'
rent law. There are more contributors and fewer beneficiar'
ies. The number of contributors does not become smaller 
than the number of beneficiaries until , rather than in 
 as under the current law. And these results are based on 
the assumption that men, on average, retire at age  and 
women at age . Were all workers to wait until ages  and 
 (males and females, respectively), the results would be 
even more favourable.  
                                                                
 While making these projections, we assumed the same economic 
and demographic scenarios as previously. 
Fiscal projections of the 
financial impacts of the 
draft law show that the 
solidarity system will be 
in balance after all the 
changes are made. The 
system shows a smaller 
surplus, due to the diver*
sion of contributions into 
the mandatory accumu*
lation system, while the 
ratios of contributors to 
beneficiaries and average 
pension to average wage 
are higher. 
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Chart . Contributors and beneficiaries 
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The table below shows a comparison between the current and 
draft laws in selected years. 
Table . Comparison of contributors, beneficiaries 
and dependency ratios 
     
Contributors, current law 
(millions) 
,. ,. ,. ,.
Contributors, draft law 
(millions) 
,. ,. ,. ,.
Beneficiaries, current law 
(millions) 
,. ,. ,. ,.
Beneficiaries, draft law  
(millions) 
,. ,. ,. ,.
Dependency ratio,  
current law 
.% .% .% .% 
Dependency ratio, draft law .% .% .% .% 
The change in retirement age also changes the distribution of 
beneficiaries by type of retirement. Following the reforms, 
there will be a lesser proportion of old'age retirees and a 
greater proportion of disabled retirees. This will put even 
more pressure on the government to significantly reform the 
entire disability retirement system.  
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Replacement ratios  
Another direct impact of the draft law is to increase replace'
ment ratios. This will result from indexing for inflation as 
well as % real wage growth. It is also caused by improve'
ments in benefits for the higher paid by phasing out the 
maximum benefit cap over time. These replacement rates 
assume men will wait until age  and women wait until age 
 to begin receiving benefits. It also includes the replace'
ment ratios from the mandatory accumulation account, as'
suming an annuity is purchased that is indexed to % of 
inflation plus % of the increase in real wages. Of course, if 
workers voluntarily choose to retire earlier with reduced 
benefits, replacement ratios will be smaller. 
Chart . Replacement ratios 
% 
,
,
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,
          
Year
As can be seen, the combination of the solidarity system and 
mandatory accumulation system under the draft law provides 
much higher replacement ratios than the current system in 
all years. Replacement ratios are much higher than the cur'
rent law from  through , and remain modestly 
higher throughout the entire analysis period.  
Pension Fund surplus and reserves 
The financial picture under the reformed pension system is 
favourable. This is primarily due to two factors: the first is the 
fact that pension indexing was less than inflation in , and 
will be much less than inflation in . The second reason is 
the favourable economic outlook for Ukraine, especially dur'
ing the next  years. High rates of real wage growth spur 
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sharp increases in contributions, producing favourable fi'
nancial results for the Pension Fund. The table below shows 
this pattern. 
Table . Pension Fund balance and reserves under the draft law 
millions hryvnias 
Year            
Surplus/ 
(Deficit) 
(.) (.) . . . . . . . . . 
Reserves   . . . . . ,. ,. ,. ,.
The chart below shows another picture of the reformed pen'
sion system. It shows Pension Fund of Ukraine revenues and 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 
Chart . Pension Fund revenues  
and expenditures 
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However, the new pension system will require very careful 
financial management. The reserves must be invested to earn 
the highest possible rate of return while minimising risks. 
This will likely require a policy of worldwide investment, 
similar to the investments for the mandatory accumulation 
system. The illustrations above assume reserves earn a rate of 
return equal to inflation plus %. If the rate of return is less, 
the financial outlook is not nearly as favourable.  
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Alternative feasible solidarity system scenarios 
During the debate over the draft laws, there will be many at'
tempts to amend major provisions. The following table shows 
financially viable scenarios (that is, the solidarity system will 
experience neither a surplus nor a deficit overall), assuming 
that the pension ages are amended. However, if pension ages 
are left at the present level, then either the accrual rate, the 
contribution rate to the mandatory accumulation system, or 
the wage indexing will have to be changed. Each option 
shows the values that these important parameters will have to 
be set at to keep the system in financial balance.  
Table . Financially viable pension reform scenarios 
 Pension ages 
(men/women) 
Contribution rate 
to mandatory ac'
cumulation system
Accrual rate per year 
of service 
Wage indexing 
CURRENT LAW “ON PENSIONS” 
 / % Men: .% for  and 
% thereafter. 
Women: .% for  
years and % thereaf'
ter 
None in law (al'
though actions 
by the GOU and 
Verkhovna Rada 
have allowed 
benefits to in'
crease)  
DRAFT LAW “ON MANDATORY STATE PENSION INSURANCE”, AUGUST VERSION 
 / (with 
early pensions 
permitted) 
.% beginning 
no sooner than 
. Certain eco'
nomic and admin'
istrative pre'
conditions must 
be met first 
Same as current law 
before ; .% per 
year starting . 
Maximum benefit 
phased'out 
% 
FEASIBLE OPTIONS 
Option  / % .% % 
Option  / % .% % 
Option  / % .% % 
Option  / % .% % 
Option  / % .% % 
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Preconditions for creating the manda'
tory accumulation system 
There are strong arguments in favour of delaying the intro'
duction of a mandatory accumulation system until four con'
ditions are met: ) a strong economy; ) completion of the 
program of personifying reporting and record'keeping by the 
Pension Fund; ) regulatory systems for the private pension 
system are operating properly; and ) the public has been 
fully informed about all aspects of the mandatory accumula'
tion system. 
A strong economy 
The first precondition is that economic conditions in 
Ukraine should be strong enough to generate sufficient 
revenues to the Pension Fund to allow some revenues to be 
diverted to the mandatory accumulation system while permit'
ting the Pension Fund to continue paying in full for solidarity 
benefits. Only a limited amount of contributions paid into 
the mandatory accumulation system or for continued solidar'
ity pension benefits should be financed either from general 
revenues of the State Budget, or from the issuance of gov'
ernment debt, or from privatisation proceeds.  
Kazakhstan attempted to start a mandatory accumulation sys'
tem by increasing the deficit in the existing solidarity system 
and its state budget. The government found it could not fi'
nance the necessary increase in government borrowing 
through ordinary means, so it forced the private pension 
funds to loan it money at below market interest rates. This 
undermined the fundamental nature of the pension reform, 
since the system’s primary focus became loaning money to 
the government at the lowest possible cost rather than maxi'
mising retirement benefits to workers. 
The financial ability of the pension system to divert contribu'
tions from the solidarity system to a mandatory accumulation 
system should be ascertained through actuarial projections by 
a trained and certified actuary using a properly designed and 
tested model of the Ukrainian pension system. The Govern'
ment of Ukraine, therefore, should make it a priority to fully 
institute the Office of the Actuary, including training of actu'
aries and development of actuarial models that comply with 
international actuarial standards.  
There are strong argu*
ments in favour of delay*
ing the introduction of a 
mandatory accumulation 
system until four precon*
ditions are met: a strong 
economy, completion of 
personification, proper 
operation of regulatory 
systems for the private 
pension system, public 
awareness of the new 
system. 
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Completion of personification 
The second condition is that the Pension Fund of Ukraine 
should have completed the design and implementation of a 
fully personified system of reporting and maintaining records 
for all working Ukrainians. Personification is a vital precondi'
tion. Both Kazakhstan and Poland have encountered major 
administrative problems from trying to introduce a manda'
tory accumulation system before they had completed the per'
sonification of the reporting and records of their pension 
systems. If the record'keeping system is not functioning 
properly, then there is no way to be sure that contributions 
are properly allocated between the solidarity and accumula'
tion systems, and among contributors. There is also no way to 
properly balance cash and data records. The usual result is 
chaos in the pension system. The record'keeping systems 
must function properly before contributions are permitted to 
begin. Problems in Kazakhstan and Poland amply illustrate 
the risks of beginning too soon. 
Proper regulatory oversight of the private pension 
system  
The third condition is that the legal and administrative infra'
structure for regulating the management and custodianship 
of pension assets has been designed, tested, and is function'
ing properly and effectively. The sudden surge of funds that 
will have to be invested demands that regulatory systems are 
already working. To try and set them up at the same time as 
the new accumulation system would guarantee a large finan'
cial catastrophe. Compliance, enforcement, transparency, 
and disclosure are critical for the success of the mandatory 
accumulation system. Without these, it is almost certain that 
contributions will be lost, illegal investments will be made, 
marketing and advertising practices will be misleading, and 
participants’ rights will be violated.  
For this reason, the mandatory accumulation system should 
not be introduced until several years after the system of non'
state private pension funds is operating. Non'state pension 
systems will benefit relatively small numbers of people – most 
of whom will be high wage earners. Therefore, the conse'
quences of any problems encountered during implementa'
tion will be smaller. 
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Public awareness 
The fourth precondition is that the system should not be in'
troduced until the public understands clearly what the man'
datory accumulation system is, and what are its risks and 
benefits. After all, the introduction of the mandatory accu'
mulation system necessarily involves the transfer of risks from 
the government to future pensioners. If financial markets 
collapse, then people retiring at the time of the collapse 
might find that their accumulated balances are smaller than 
those of their colleagues who retired a few months or a few 
years earlier. 
The public needs to understand several aspects of the manda'
tory accumulation before it is implemented. For example, 
women will receive smaller annuity benefits when they retire 
than men, even if both have accumulated the same amount 
in their individual accounts. This is because women live 
longer after retirement than men. Today, a Ukrainian woman 
reaching pension age ( years) can expect to live an addi'
tional . years, a man only  years after reaching retire'
ment age of . An annuity will offer the women smaller 
monthly benefits, because those benefits will have to be paid 
for a longer time. In addition, women are likely to have ac'
cumulated less money, because they will have worked for 
fewer years and will have earned lower wages. A mandatory 
accumulation system, therefore, will provide lower pensions 
for women.  
Some countries – Croatia, for example – have tried to over'
come this by requiring insurance companies to offer the 
same monthly annuity payments for men and women if both 
have accumulated the same balance in their individual ac'
counts. Another way of overcoming this problem is for the 
government to make payments into women’s accounts during 
the periods when they are not earning but raising young chil'
dren.  
As life expectancy grows in Ukraine, the monthly payments 
received by people retiring, expressed as a percent of the 
amount accumulated in account balances, will decline – the 
result of having to continue the payments for a longer period 
of time. This decline will be lower if pension age is increasing 
at the same time that life expectancy is increasing. Again, 
people have to understand this if they are not to feel betrayed 
by the system when they retire in the future and receive 
smaller benefits than they had anticipated. 
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Finally, the public needs to understand that the administra'
tive expenses for the accumulated system are higher than for 
the state solidarity system. In Chile, for example, average ad'
ministrative expenses per client in Chile in the s consti'
tuted .% of wages from which contributions were calcu'
lated, or about % of contributions. Comparable levels of 
administrative expenses are found in other private pension 
systems as well. 
Risks and benefits of the new system 
From the preceding discussions, we may conclude that a 
properly designed mandatory accumulation system offers 
several benefits to future pensioners and to the government. 
But these benefits are not achieved without costs. The Gov'
ernment of Ukraine and the public as a whole must be aware 
of not only the benefits of the mandatory accumulation sys'
tem but also about its potential risks. The risks and benefits of 
a mandatory accumulation system are summarised in the fol'
lowing table. 
Table . Risks and benefits of a mandatory accumulation system  
in Ukraine 
Benefits Risks 
. Participants have their own pension ac'
counts (something like bank savings accounts) 
that protect them from undue interference 
from the Government. 
. If contributions yield a small amount of 
interest, net of expenses, participants may get 
a smaller pension than from a solidarity pen'
sion system. Participants may lose all their 
money in case of wrong investment and the 
failure of the regulatory system to operate ef'
fectively. 
. As the amount of the future pension de'
pends on the amount of contributions, par'
ticipants are encouraged to pay them or to 
make their employer pay them – this will be a 
factor encouraging firms to emerge from the 
“shadow” economy into the formal economy. 
. As the amount of the future pension de'
pends on the amount of contributions, low'
income participants will receive smaller bene'
fits than those with high incomes, because 
they will have accumulated less in their funds. 
Hence, the government will need to provide 
them additional assistance. 
. Participants who earn higher wages will 
make larger contributions and will receive 
larger payments – a stronger incentive to work 
and earn more than under the solidarity sys'
tem. 
. The mandatory accumulation system has no 
mechanism to provide pension benefits to the 
elderly who are poor, or to shift benefits from 
high income participants to low income par'
ticipants, as pensions depend wholly on con'
tributions paid by each individual. 
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Benefits Risks 
. If asset investments are under private man'
agement, the returns earned by the funds are 
likely to be higher than returns earned if the 
government invested the accumulated bal'
ances – providing asset managers are properly 
regulated and selected on competitive, per'
formance'based tenders, and provided that 
the government does not artificially restrict 
investment to the domestic market. 
. The working disabled, chronically unem'
ployed, and women raising children cannot 
save money for decent benefits prior to pen'
sion age. 
. Switching from a pay'as'you go pension sys'
tem to an accumulation system will increase 
the availability of investment capital in 
Ukraine. 
. If the government cannot afford the transi'
tion cost, they may force the private pension 
funds to loan them money at below market 
interest rates. This will use up available cred'
its, and will not generate economic growth. 
. Pension age is not a structural element of 
the system. Participants can establish a desired 
benefit amount and pension age on their own.
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Conclusions 
Ukraine has embarked on an extensive reform of its pension 
system. The projections in this paper are intended to help 
policymakers as they evaluate the options before them. The 
decisions they face are not easy: the basic demographic 
trends in Ukraine will continue to raise the number of pen'
sioners relative to the number of contributors to the pension 
system.  
Nevertheless, there are some opportunities to improve the 
situation for Ukrainian pensioners. The present solidarity 
system can continue to support pensioners without plunging 
into a large deficit. Once economic growth begins, benefits 
can eventually be lifted above their present low levels. In the 
meantime, however, Ukraine will have to deal with the prob'
lem of poverty among the elderly by expanding targeted so'
cial assistance, which will provide income supplements to 
pensioners living in low'income families. These projections 
have assumed that there is no net shift of enterprises and 
employees from the shadow economy to the official economy. 
If the new program of personification and other necessary 
improvements in tax and contribution collections are made, 
then the financial situation of the solidarity system could im'
prove considerably – allowing additional improvements in 
benefits, reductions in the overall contribution rate, and in'
creases in the contributions to the mandatory accumulation 
system. 
As the government has acknowledged in the latest draft Law, 
“On mandatory state pension insurance”, the best way to pro'
vide pensioners with better benefits, and benefits that pro'
vide a greater reward for those who have worked for many 
years in well'paid jobs, is by raising the pension age. The 
elimination of privileged pensions will also provide the Pen'
sion Fund with resources to provide better and more equita'
ble benefits. 
The creation of a mandatory accumulation system will pro'
vide people with the opportunity to save money for their own 
retirement. But there are many problems in implementing a 
mandatory accumulation system to ensure that these savings 
are protected and earn a reasonable rate of return. As pro'
posed in the current draft law, the new accumulation system 
will be largely funded from surpluses in the solidarity system, 
rather than through borrowing or use of privatisation pro'
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ceeds. The success of the new pension program will also de'
pend on the government’s ability to create the necessary ad'
ministrative systems to allow accurate record'keeping of the 
individual accounts, proper auditing to prevent mismanage'
ment, and the creation of proper regulatory systems. As the 
experience of many countries shows all too clearly, these are 
not easy tasks. Premature implementation of the mandatory 
accumulation system could create a financial catastrophe that 
would have serious implications for the government’s overall 
financial stability. 
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Appendix A. Pension systems 
throughout the world 
Almost all nations have developed pension systems, and in all these pension systems the govern'
ment has played crucial roles. But systems differ widely, reflecting differences in prevailing eco'
nomic conditions, political structures, national preferences for allocating responsibilities among 
the public and private sectors, and accidents of history. Therefore no single approach to pension 
reform can be adopted universally. Table A' shows the variety of approaches to pension policy 
adopted in  countries that were surveyed by the US Social Security Administration – the 
agency that administers the US solidarity pension system. 
Table A*. Types of pension systems throughout 
the world 
Characteristics of financing and benefits Number of pen'
sion systems 
System basing benefits on previous contributions
and earnings 
 
System of mandatory state accumulation   
System of mandatory individual accumulation   
System without contributions, in which benefits are
distributed based on need 
 
Universal system without contributions  
System of stable benefits based on contributions  
Total:  
Note: six out of  surveyed countries offered no government'
organised pension systems. 
Source: Social Security Programs Through the World*. 
U.S. Social Security Administration, , Research Report N. 
In the  countries there were a total of  pension systems, although six countries offered no 
government'organised pension systems at all. All but five pension systems linked benefits to past 
contributions, and  systems were based on accumulation of savings –  by individuals and  
by the state.  pension systems were similar to Ukraine’s – solidarity systems in which benefits 
are based on past contributions and service records. 
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Appendix B. Key economic and 
pension system indicators for 
Ukraine ()) 
          
Real GDP ' . '. '. '. '. '. '. '. '. 
Real GDP (=) . . . . . . . . . 
Industrial output '. '. '. '. '. '. '. '. . 
Inflation  , ,   . . . . 
Balance of state budget  
(in % to GDP) 
''' '. '. '. '. '. '. '. '. 
Employment '. '. '. '. . '. '. '. '. 
Unemployment (%)          
registered ''' . . . . . . . . 
calculated by ILO methods  ''' ''' ''' ''' . . . . . 
Real wages  . '. '. '. . '. '. '. '. 
Real wages (=) . . . . . . . . . 
Exchange rate of hryvnia to 
US dollar (year'end) 
'''  , , , . . . .
Discount rate, end of the 
year 
N/A.  . . .  . . . 
Capitalised value of all 
traded shares as % of GDP 
''' ''' ''' ''' ''' . . . . 
Population, millions . . . . . . . . . 
Number of retirees, mil'
lions 
. . . . . . . . . 
Retirees (as % of the popu'
lation) 
. . . . . . . . — 
Pension expenditures (in % 
to GDP) 
. . . . . . . . — 
Ratio of contributors to 
retirees  
. . . . . . . . . 
Real pension (=) . . . . . . . . . 
Replacement ratio (ratio of 
the average benefits to the 
average wages) 
. . . . . . . . . 
Notes:  
.Changes y*o*y (in %)  
.Percentage of economically active (i.e., working) population 
.According to annual sample labour surveys in October * and quarterly surveys first done in  
.In – – in karbovanets, from  – in hryvnias 
.Number of contributors is the ratio of the payroll fund to the average wage in economy 
Source: State Committee for Statistics, National Bank of Ukraine, author’s estimates.
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Appendix C. Questions and an)
swers about Ukraine’s current 
pension system 
. What types of pension benefits are there? 
Labour and social pensions are available. There are four types of labour pensions:  
• Old'age pensions: This includes both standard and early old'age pensions. 
• Disability pensions: Different types of pensions are available, depending on the severity of the 
disability. 
• Survivor pensions: These are payable to children, parents, and others who lose support as a 
result of the death of a principal wage earner. 
• Long'service pensions: These are special pensions for those involved in industries requiring 
early retirement. Most positions are in the transportation industry. 
Social pensions: This is payable to those with insufficient service to quality for other pensions. 
The social pension is also the minimum pension payable to other categories of pensioners (Arti'
cle ). 
. When do pension payments begin? 
Old'age pensions begin from the day you reach your retirement age. Disability pensions are paid 
from the day the medical and social expert agency issues a decision confirming your eligibility. 
Survivor pensions are paid from the day your right to receive the pension was granted (Article 
). 
. What are the eligibility conditions for a standard old*age pension? 
To receive an old age pension, a male must have attained age  and have at least  years of ser'
vice, and a female must have attained age  and have at least  years of service. Those with less 
than the required amount of service receive a short'service old'age pension (Articles  and ). 
. What is the pension amount for standard old*age retirement? 
For a man who has attained age  and has  years of service or a woman who has attained age 
 with  years of service, the standard pension is % of average monthly wages. For each addi'
tional year of service, the pension is increased by % of average monthly wages, to a maximum of 
%. The pension calculated under this formula is subject to both a minimum and maximum 
amount. It may also be increased for supplementary payments (Article ). 
. What pension does someone with less than the standard service period receive? 
The pension is prorated to reflect the lesser period of service. If a man had  years of service at 
retirement rather then the required  years, the benefit would be % of pay (% *  / ) 
instead of % (Article ). 
                                                                
 Based on the current law “On pensions”. 
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. How is average monthly wage calculated? 
Average monthly wages is equal to the greater of the average pay for the  months immediately 
preceding the date the pension is calculated, or the highest  consecutive months at any time in 
the worker’s career. For retirees using wages on or after January , , pensions have been 
recalculated at various times using wage coefficients (Article ). 
. How is service calculated? 
Service is granted for all periods of time for which contributions were made to the Pension Fund. 
In addition, service credit is given for certain periods when contributions were not paid. The 
most common additional service credit periods are: 
• military service, and service in units and agencies of state security and internal affairs (Article 
c and d); 
• study in higher and secondary educational institutions, advanced training courses, and other 
types of education (Article e); 
• periods of service while caring for certain types of disabled (Article g); 
• certain periods of child care (Article h); 
• occupational disability periods (end of Article ); 
• military service during periods of hostilities (Article ); 
• citizens who were unlawfully detained, imprisoned or exiled (Article ); 
• work or forced confinement during the Second World War (Article ); 
• work in hospital for lepers and plague'carriers (Article ). 
Consequently, it’s possible for service to include a great deal of time for which contributions to 
the system were not made. 
. What is the minimum pension amount? 
For anyone with the full amount of service needed for retirement, a minimum benefit is payable. 
The minimum rate of old'age pension is equal to the minimum consumer budget. In times of 
economic hardship, however, this minimum can be reduced to a rate not lower than the subsis'
tence level. The subsistence rate was set at  UAH per month as of January , . However, 
this rate is not used at this time to adjust pension benefits. The minimum pension benefit as of 
September ,  is . hryvnias. For those with less than the required amount of service, the 
minimum benefit is prorated, but cannot be less than % of the minimum old'age pension 
(. UAH) (Articles  and ). 
. What is the maximum pension amount? 
The maximum pension for old'age pensioners is three times the minimum pension rate. Cur'
rently, the maximum pension for a full'service pensioner is . hryvnias.  
. Are there any supplemental pensions payable to old*age pensioners? 
Yes. There are several special supplements paid to old'age pensioners. These are paid in addition 
to the basic pension, even for those individuals who are receiving a minimum or maximum pen'
sion. 
• All non'working retirees, including short service retirees, are eligible for subsistence pecuni'
ary aid. These individuals can receive additional payments up to a maximum of . UAH 
per month if their pension is less than  UAH per month (CMU Decree dated July , ). 
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• If a non'working pensioner is supporting a family member who is entitled to a survivor bene'
fit, then an additional pension is payable for each such family member. The payment is equal 
to the social pension for that person, based on their category of disability. The additional 
pension can vary from % to % of the minimum pension per person (. UAH to . 
UAH per person) (Articles  and ). 
• Single pensioners that require permanent outside medical care receive a supplement of % 
of a social pension (. UAH) (Article ). 
• Individuals subjected to unlawful political repression and later rehabilitated have pensions 
increased by % of a minimum old'age pension (. UAH). Members of their families who 
were forcibly resettled have pensions increased by % of a minimum old age pension (. 
UAH) (Article ). 
• Other war veterans and civilians that served in front'line forces or participated in combat 
actions receive % of a minimum old age pension (. UAH) (Article ). 
• Single non'working individuals who have reached retirement age can receive state pecuniary 
aid of up to  UAH per month if their pension is less than  UAH per month, and the per 
capita income of the household in which they live is less than  UAH per month (CMU De'
cree No. , dated January , ). 
The effect of all these provisions taken together is that no full service pensioner receives less than 
. UAH (minimum pension of . UAH plus a supplement of . UAH), and many pen'
sioners receive the maximum pension of . UAH. However, since a pensioner can be eligible 
for multiple supplements, it’s possible to get a much higher benefit amount. 
. How long are old*age pensions paid? 
Pensions are paid until the individual dies. 
. Can pensioners continue to work after retirement? 
Yes. Workers are permitted to draw pensions and continue working. In this situation, the pen'
sion amount can be recalculated every two years to reflect increases in pay. For short service pen'
sioners, increases in pension will reflect both increased pay and service (Articles  and ). 
. Who is eligible for early old*age pensions? 
The pension law allows certain categories of workers to retire prior to age  or , and/or with 
less than the required amount of service. In order to qualify for these early pensions, the worker 
must have a certain minimum number of years in the qualifying profession as well. Generally, 
these are professions that are hazardous or strenuous. For List No.  and List No.  employees, 
benefits begin earlier if the individual has satisfied at least half the service requirement in the 
profession (Article ). 
. Who pays for the additional cost of early pensions? 
Payments to List No.  are the responsibility of the Pension Fund. For all other early retirement 
pensions, enterprises and organisations must make payments to the Pension Fund sufficient to 
pay pensions until the individual reaches the standard retirement age. In actuality, these pay'
ments have often not been made, and the Pension Fund has had to pay these pensions from its 
revenues (Article ). 
. How are benefits for early old*age pensioners calculated? 
Generally, benefits are calculated in the same way as normal old'age pensions. However, there 
are certain differences: 
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• the maximum pension as a percent of pay is equal to % of average monthly wages for those 
on List No. , and for those listed in Article ; 
• the maximum pension is four times the minimum pension, or . UAH for those with full 
service on List No.  and for those listed in Article . 
. Are there supplemental pensions payable to early old*age pensioners? 
Yes. The same supplements which are payable to standard old'age pensioners are also payable to 
early old'age retirees. 
. How do long*service pensions differ from early old*age pensions? 
Long'service pensions are in a separate part of the pension law. Early old'age pensions are pro'
vided to those who work in hazardous professions or under conditions of extreme hardship. 
Long'service pensions, however, are given to those whose employment causes loss of professional 
ability or capacity for work prior to the old'age pension retirement age. Also, these pensions are 
paid by the Pension Fund, whereas most early old'age pensions are supposed to be paid by the 
employer. 
. Who is eligible for a long*service pension? 
 Generally, the following categories of workers are eligible for long'service pensions: 
• flight and test'flight personnel; 
• members of locomotive crew, and workers that organise transportation and guarantee railway 
and subway transport safety; 
• certain truck drivers in the mining industry; 
• dock mechanics in ports, seafaring personnel on fishing industry fleet; 
• workers involved in field geologic surveying, prospecting, hydrology and forest engineering; 
• workers involved in timber cutting; 
• some theatre and show performers; 
• education, health care, and social protection specialists working with pensioners and dis'
abled; 
• athletes (Articles ,  and ). 
. What benefits do long*service pensioners receive? 
All categories of long'service pensioners except flight and test'flight personnel have their pen'
sions calculated the same way as all other old'age pensioners. The minimum and maximum pen'
sion amounts are the same as well. Benefits for flight and test flight personnel are similar, except 
the maximum pension amount is % of pay, and there is no maximum pension. 
. Are there any supplemental pensions payable to long*service pensioners? 
Yes. The same supplements which are payable to standard and early old'age pensioners are also 
payable to long'service retirees. 
. Who is eligible for a disability pension? 
Anyone who suffers a complete or partial loss of health is granted a disability pension, payable 
regardless of whether the disability is occupational, or due to general illness. This includes those 
who were disabled since childhood. All disabilities are divided into  groups, depending on the 
severity of the disability (Article ). 
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. What is an occupational disability? 
Disabilities because of injury are considered occupational if they occur in the following circum'
stances: 
• while performing job duties; 
• while on a business trip; 
• on the way to or from work; 
• on or near the place of work during normal work hours, including breaks; 
• while performing official or public duties. 
All other disabilities are considered to be for general illness (Article ). 
. What are the eligibility conditions for an occupational disability pension? 
Disability pensions for labour injury or occupational disease are granted regardless of length of 
employment. There are no age or service requirements (Articles  and ). 
. What are the eligibility conditions for general illness disability pension? 
The required employment period increases with age. Those who do not meet the service condi'
tions are eligible for a prorated pension (Articles ,  and ). 
. What benefits do disability pensioners receive? 
The benefit amount depends on the disability category that is assigned. Benefits are equal to a 
percent of average monthly wage, as follows: 
• group  – %; 
• group  – %; 
• group  – %. 
If a worker has sufficient service for an old'age pension (standard or early), then the disability 
pension will be equal to the old'age pension. A worker who does not have sufficient service to 
qualify for a general illness pension, will receive a prorated pension (Article ). 
. Is there a special minimum disability pension? 
Yes. The minimum disability pension is equal to the social pension for the disability group. The 
minimum pension applies to regular as well as short'service disabilities. These minimum pen'
sions are: 
• group  – % of the minimum old'age pension (. UAH); 
• group  – % of the minimum old'age pension (. UAH); 
• group  – % of the minimum old'age pension (. UAH). 
. Is there a maximum disability pension? 
Yes. The maximum disability pension is the same as the maximum for old'age pensions (Article 
). 
. Are there any other types of payments made to disabled pensioners? 
Yes. There are supplements payable to certain types of disabled pensioners. 
• Non'working disabled that support disabled family members receive one social pension for 
each disabled family member, based on that person’s category of disability. 
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• Group  or single Group  disabled that either require permanent outside care or have 
reached retirement receive % of the minimum old'age pension (. UAH). 
• Group  single disabled that have reached retirement age receive % of the minimum old'
age pension (. UAH). 
• Chornobyl victims receive payments and bonuses in accordance with the law “On status and 
social protection of victims of the Chornobyl Catastrophe” (Article ). 
• Old'age pensions to disabled veterans – the pension is increased by a minimum disability 
pension based on the law of Ukraine “On pension security of servicemen” (Article ). 
• Pensions for those disabled since childhood or to survivors because of serious injuries in'
flicted in combat operations during WWII receive % of a minimum old'age pension (. 
UAH) (Article ). 
• Single individuals who are group  or  disabled, or families comprised of the above indi'
viduals can receive state pecuniary aid of up to  UAH per month if their pension is less than 
 UAH per month, and the per capita income of the household in which they live is less than 
 UAH per month (CMU Decree No. , date January , ). 
It is possible to receive more than one type of supplement (Article ). 
. When do disability pensions stop? 
Disabled people who are over age  for men, or  for women, receive benefits for life. Other 
disability pensions are granted for as long as the individual remains disabled. Disabled individu'
als must go for re'examination periodically in order to continue receiving benefits. Disabled pen'
sioners who do not go to scheduled examinations may have their benefits stopped. 
. Who is eligible for a survivor pension? 
The following types of individuals are eligible for a survivor benefit: 
• “disabled” family members that were supported by a deceased principal wage earner; 
• children, regardless of whether the principal wage earner supported them; 
• parents or spouse who loses their means of subsistence as a result of the death of the principal 
wage earner. 
The following family members are considered “disabled”: 
• children, siblings, and grandchildren under age  (under age  if a student) receive % 
of minimum old'age pension (. UAH); 
• children, siblings, and grandchildren over age , if they became disabled prior to age  
receive % of the minimum old'age pension (. UAH); 
• siblings and grandchildren if both parents are unable to work receive % of the minimum 
old'age pension (. UAH); 
• father, mother, spouse who is disabled receives a pension based on their disability group; 
• father, mother, spouse who have attained age  for men or  for women receives either 
% or % of the minimum old'age pension; 
• one of the following—parents, spouse, grandparents, siblings – who does not work in order to 
care for children, siblings or grandchildren of the deceased who are under age ; 
• grandparents if there is no one who is legally required to care for them receives either % or 
% of the minimum old'age pension. 
Foster parents and adopted children have the same rights as parents and natural children. Step'
parents who supported a deceased child for at least  years and stepchildren who receive no 
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payments from their natural parents are also eligible for survivor pensions. The survivor pension 
does not stop because of the remarriage of the surviving spouse (Articles , ,  and ). 
. What benefit do the eligible survivors receive? 
The basic survivor pension for each “disabled” family member is % of the average monthly 
wage of the principal wage earner. This amount for each beneficiary cannot be less than the so'
cial pension for the corresponding category of disability. If a child loses both parents, the pen'
sion is calculated on the sum of the wage of the two parents combined. A child who loses both 
parents or a single mother gets a minimum pension equal to double the amount of the social 
pension. If the deceased died as a result of general illness and had not met the service require'
ments for a full disability pension, then the benefit is prorated based on actual period of em'
ployment. However, the pension for each disabled family member is still equal to at least the 
amount of the social pension for the corresponding category of disability. The full benefit 
amount is normally paid as a lump sum to the family of the deceased. However, individual family 
members can apply to have their portion paid separately. 
. How long are survivor benefits paid? 
Benefits are paid for as long as a person is considered disabled. The total benefit amount can 
change as the number of eligible family members changes. Benefits are paid for life to family 
members that attain age  for men or age  for women.  
. Are there any funeral benefits? 
Yes. When a pensioner dies, the family, or the person who organised the funeral is entitled to 
funeral assistance equal to two months of pension payments (Article ). 
. Who is eligible for a social pension? 
Social pensions are granted to individuals who are not eligible for a labour pension. This in'
cludes the following categories of individuals: 
• disabled of all groups; 
• individuals who attain age  for men or  for women; 
• children who lose a principal wage earner; 
• disabled minors under age . 
. What is the amount of social pensions? 
The amount paid varies by category, as shown below: 
• % of the prior minimum old'age pension (. UAH) '' individuals who reached retire'
ment age ( or ) and were not eligible for a labour pension without a valid reason;  
• % of the prior minimum old'age pension (. UAH) '' individuals who reached retire'
ment age ( or ) and were not eligible for a labour pension because of a valid reason; 
• % of the minimum old'age pension (. UAH) – group  disabled; 
• % of minimum old'age pension (. UAH): 
− group  disabled; 
− disabled minors under age ; 
− children, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren under age ; 
− caretaker looking after children under age  due to the death of a principal wage earner. 
• % of minimum old'age pension (. UAH): 
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− group  disabled; 
− mothers conferred the title “Heroine Mother”. 
. Are there any supplements payable to social pensioners? 
All non'working retirees, including social pensioners who are over age  for men and  for 
women, are eligible for subsistence pecuniary aid. Old'age social pensioners can receive addi'
tional payments up to a maximum of . UAH per month if their pension is less than  UAH 
per month. 
. Who pays for pensions? 
Arrangements differ among agricultural enterprises, the self'employed, and other workers. The 
vast majority of enterprises are required to contribute % of each worker’s salary, up to , 
hryvnias per month. Employees must also contribute. Those making less than  hryvnias per 
month must pay % of their wages to the Pension Fund, while those earning in excess of  
hryvnias pay %. Agricultural enterprises make a contribution to the Treasury based on rates per 
hectare of land under cultivation. The Treasury gives a fixed portion of this revenue to the Pen'
sion Fund. Similarly, the self'employed pay a flat contribution to the Treasury, a portion of which 
is given to the Pension Fund. Agricultural enterprises are supposed to return to a payroll'based 
contribution beginning in . 
The Pension Fund also receives revenues from a variety of other sources. For example, there is 
excise on automobile purchases, mobile phones, currency transactions, and jewellery purchases. 
These taxes are supposed to be eliminated once the Pension Fund starts to run a surplus. In ad'
dition, the Pension Fund receives contributions from the United Nations, from voluntary con'
tributions, and from reimbursements made by employers for privileged pensions. 
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Appendix D. Methods, assump)
tions, and information sources 
. General description of the PROST model 
The PROST model was developed by the World Bank. The primary purpose of the model is to 
allow analysis of pension systems and pension reform proposals. The model uses parameterised 
input spreadsheets to specify all the assumptions used for the projections, and to define the pen'
sion system’s benefit formula and contribution scheme. Although the model is parameterised, 
properly coding the system still requires someone with a strong background in pension system 
design and finances. As with any model, the quality of the output directly depends on the care 
and skill with which the input parameters are determined. Because the model is regularly main'
tained by a skilled team, and because it is relatively easy for experienced professionals as well as 
government officials to use it, the PROST model is an excellent tool for pension reform analysis. 
The Bank has a dedicated team of programmers who update and maintain the model regularly. 
The most recent model is version , which was released earlier this year. The Bank has used the 
model in analyses of pension issues in many countries, and the results of the model have fre'
quently been the basis of Bank projects to support pension reform. 
The PROST model is designed to be used with “stock” and “population” parameters. This means 
the model directly calculates the total number of retirees at each point in time (i.e., the “stock” of 
retirees), rather than projecting the number of new retirees and the number of retiree deaths, 
and calculating the total number of retirees. This second method is called the “flow” approach. 
The World Bank uses the “stock” approach because they believe the total number of retirees is a 
far more stable and predictable variable than the number of new retirees. 
The total number of retirees at any point in time is determined by first specifying the percentage 
of the population at each age which is retired. At the beginning of the projection period, this 
number can be directly calculated by simply dividing the number of retirees at a given age by the 
total population at that age. If pension eligibility is not changed, the basic presumption is that 
these percentages should remain relatively constant over time. Consequently, as the structure of 
the total population changes, the structure of the retired population will change proportionately.  
The model uses a similar approach to calculate the size of the labour force at any point in time. 
The user specifies the percentage of the population employed by age and sex. This percentage is 
then multiplied by the population to get the total size of the labour force. This is called the 
“population” approach, as opposed to the “employment” approach, in which the labour force 
and other variables are expressed as a percentage of those employed rather than as a percentage 
of the population. The World Bank argues that employment statistics in most developing nations 
are poorly measured and unreliable. While the population statistics are also imperfect, they are 
more accurate and stable than employment numbers. Consequently, the PROST model usually 
expresses parameters as percentages of the population, and then directly calculates the totals 
rather than by projecting flows. 
Of course, there are well'developed theoretical relationships between the stock and flow ap'
proaches and between the employment and population approaches. While a thorough discussion 
of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that in the course of our analysis, 
we encountered some anomalies in some starting values of variables as a percent of the popula'
tion. This is because the various counts by age and of the total population were not measured at 
the same date, and because some of the distributions by age had to be estimated. We “smoothed” 
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these anomalies over a period of ten years in our analysis in order to avoid any sharp discontinui'
ties in projections. 
PROST is a fairly general model. This means that many needed parameters have to be derived 
independently first, and then input to the model. Two additional tools have been used for this 
purpose. The first is a personified database of all pensioners for Mykolaiv oblast. The second is a 
short'term Excel model that provides much more detail than the PROST model. This model pro'
jects only through , but contains detailed statistics and disaggregates benefits into more 
components. In many cases, we have imported analysis from the Excel model into the PROST 
model. For example, when determining the impact of the September ,  increase in mini'
mum and maximum pensions, it is not sufficient to simply estimate the impact for a pensioner 
receiving the average pension. The impact of the change in the minimum and maximum pen'
sions affects low income pensioners very differently from the way it affects high income pension'
ers. Consequently, we calculated impacts on pensioners in many different economic circum'
stances, weighted the results by the proportion of pensioners of each type in the country, and 
entered the weighted average into the model. We did this by calculating benefits before and after 
the change on each of Mykolaiv oblast’s , pensioners. If this procedure is not followed, 
the output will be seriously flawed. 
The same procedures were used to make projections of the draft law. The draft law introduces a 
maximum wage cap, phases out the maximum benefit, and introduces a flat accrual rate for'
mula. This affects pensioners differently according to their year of retirement and level of earn'
ings. Making a single estimate for an “average individual” would give a misleading result. There'
fore, we analysed impacts on different types of individuals and weighted results to determine the 
“average” impact. In other words, the average impact is not equal to the impact on the average 
person. To avoid this problem, we developed a special spreadsheet that determines impacts on 
retirees at different income levels and who retire in different years. 
We employed several other methodological issues, the most important of which are:  
• All calculations are on an accrual basis, and ignore existing debts of enterprises to the Pen'
sion Fund, whether due to non'payment of wages or for other reasons. Calculations also ig'
nore all existing benefit payment arrears. 
• All calculations are for the Pension Fund only, and fully incorporate the government’s plan 
to move expenditures on social pensions and pension supplements back to the State Budget. 
There is a major issue of how the government plans to pay for these social programs from the 
budget. Shifting these payments from the Pension Fund to the budget obviously does not re'
duce total payments but does recognise that these are social assistance payments, not pension 
insurance payments. 
• Our projections do not include payments made to non'career military personnel, payments 
to Chernobyl beneficiaries, or any other payments that are not the responsibility of the Pen'
sion Fund. Therefore, Pension Fund expenditures do not include payments to these benefi'
ciaries, even though the payments are made by the Pension Fund on behalf of others. Simi'
larly, Pension Fund revenue does not include the reimbursements received from these other 
organisations. 
. General spreadsheet 
Base and end years: Our base year is . However, since it is now late , we calibrated our 
assumptions to also reproduce  results. We selected a 'year period because this allows us to 
follow almost all Ukrainians who are alive today through their entire expected lifetime. This also 
allows us to study both the transition from the old to the reformed system, which lasts about  
years, and also to study how the new system behaves in the  years following transition. A 'year 
period is also the standard for actuarial projections of the U.S. Social Security system. 
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 base year information: This information was all taken from published reports of the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Policy, Ministry of Economy, and Derzhkomstat (State Statistics Commit'
tee). The purpose of the starting GDP number is to allow key pension variables to be expressed 
in absolute terms, and also as a percentage of GDP.  
Average wage: This is taken from Derzhkomstat reports. It represents the average reported wage 
for full'time workers in the formal sector of the economy. The  average wage, when pro'
jected forward, is equal to the projected average wage for  from Derzhkomstat.  
Demographic trends: The mortality rate for disabled pensioners and social pensioners (many of 
whom are disabled), is assumed to be % higher than the mortality for other citizens.  
Macroeconomic trends, and wage growth elasticity with respect to GDP: These sections contain the key 
macroeconomic variables – inflation, real GDP growth, real wage growth, and real interest rates. 
This section also contains “load factors” for miscellaneous revenue and expense of the Pension 
Fund of Ukraine. The macroeconomic variables were estimated by the International Centre for 
Policy Studies, and are generally more optimistic than official government forecasts. The reve'
nue load factors were derived by examining the size of miscellaneous sources of revenue com'
pared to revenue from payroll contributions. This was converted into a percent increase factor. 
The largest component of the miscellaneous sources of revenue is excise taxes on jewellery, cars, 
currency transactions, mobile phones and other luxury items. These taxes are supposed to expire 
once there is a surplus in the Pension Fund of Ukraine. Based on our models, this occurs in 
, so this source of revenue has been eliminated, beginning in . 
The expense load factors were derived by examining the size of miscellaneous sources of expense 
compared to benefit payments to pensioners. This includes such items as childcare allowances, 
funeral allowances and payments to public servants. This factor becomes negative starting in 
, since it is used to reflect the government’s separation of sources of financing program. In 
, social pensions, payments to some civil servants and certain supplements are moved to the 
State budget. In , remaining supplements and payments to war veterans are moved to the 
budget. Social pensions are directly reflected in the model by setting the percent of the popula'
tion receiving social pensions to zero in . The other items are moved by using a negative 
load factor. 
Pension age and length of service at retirement: This field represents the standard age when males and 
females begin receiving pensions and the average amount of service on this date. If the benefit 
formula approach (discussed later in the Appendix) is not used, the length'of'service factors have 
little effect on the financial projections. They are used only to determine the implicit pension 
debt. Retirement age, however, does have an impact on assumed labour force participation rates, 
unemployment rates, and rates of retirement as a percentage of the population. 
Pension contribution and collection rates: The pension contribution rate is % from employers and 
either % or % from employees. Those earning more than  hryvnia per month must con'
tribute % of their wages to the Pension Fund, while those earning less contribute only %. Since 
 hryvnias is slightly less than the average  wage of . hryvnias, the average contribu'
tion rate is .%. We have kept this rate constant over time, because we assumed both the ,'
hryvnia and 'hryvnia limit would increase proportionately to wages. Otherwise, in a few years, 
all workers would be contributing % of wages. 
The collection rate variable is supposed to represent the proportion of contributions collected 
from those who actually contribute. A different variable – the exemption and evasion rate – is 
used to estimate the number of workers who are either exempted from contributing or evade 
contributions entirely. In actuality, we use this variable as a balancing item to match the Pension 
Fund’s actual results. For example, the average wage of contributors is actually less than the aver'
age wage of formal sector full'time workers, primarily because many part'time workers make con'
tributions to the Pension Fund. Also, many registered employers make contributions on an “offi'
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cial” salary, and not on the actual salary paid to workers. Somewhere, an “adjustment” must be 
made to accurately reflect the actual contributions collected by the Pension Fund. This collec'
tion variable is used as the balancing item to increase the accuracy of the projections.  
We also adjusted our calculations to reflect loss of revenue between  and  due to the 
agricultural flat tax. Based on estimates in our Excel model, we reduced revenue by .% for 
those years. This adjustment factor was eliminated in , when agricultural enterprises begin 
paying payroll'based taxes again. Another possible approach would have been to reduce the 
number of contributors in those years. This would have been much more complex to code in the 
PROST model. Consequently, we did not adjust the number of contributors, and used the collec'
tion rate variable instead.  
In our analysis, we assumed personification will increase compliance over time among regis'
tered, formal sector employers. Personification provides a powerful incentive for employees to 
demand their employers make contributions on their full wages, since this personified wage his'
tory will be the basis for benefit calculations at retirement. However, we did not assume that per'
sonification would cause employers to move from the shadow economy into the formal economy. 
We believe significant additional economic reforms would be needed to reduce the size of the 
shadow economy. 
Replacement rate, survivor and social pensioners: Total and average benefits for survivor and social 
pensioners were obtained from Report # of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. Per'
centage adjustment factors for the September ,  increase in the minimum and maximum 
benefits were derived by recalculating benefits using a personified database for Mykolaiv oblast. 
The replacement ratio was then calculated by dividing the average benefit for each group by the 
average wage in the economy. 
Pension indexation: According to the law, “On Indexing Money Income of People”, pension bene'
fits are indexed to changes in the consumer price index. Whenever the cumulative index in'
creases by more than % since the date of the last indexing, pensions are adjusted. Specific in'
structions for indexing are contained in Cabinet of Ministers Decree Number , dated De'
cember , . These instructions actually produce indexing that is less than inflation. Our 
indexing factors for  and  reflect actual indexing granted during each year. It also re'
flects the increase in the minimum and maximum benefits effective September , . We de'
termined the impact of this indexing using our personified Mykolaiv database, and translated it 
into an equivalent indexing factor for purposes of modelling. 
Administrative cost: This is the cost of pension system administration as a percent of benefit pay'
ments. The starting value is the cost today as derived from the Pension Fund’s financial state'
ments. One of the reasons for the high cost in Ukraine is the excessive charges levied by Bank 
“Aval” and the post office for their delivery services. Over time, this cost must be reduced. The 
% cost for  is the average cost of a well'run system in Western Europe or the United States. 
Expenses are assumed to decrease linearly over the 'year period. 
Other variables: Not used. No impact on results. 
. Population spreadsheet 
Population by age and sex on January , : We examined population information from several 
different sources including population projections from an earlier study by Tacis, projections 
from Derzhkomstat, augmented with the results of extensive discussions with both Ella Libanova 
and Valentyna Steshenko from the National Academy of Sciences. We selected the Tacis study as 
the basis, but, because Tacis data is as of the start of the year and PROST input data must be the 
average population over the course of the year, we averaged projected values for the beginning 
and end of  to estimate starting values. 
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Fertility: Starting fertility rates by age were available from Tacis and the National Academy of Sci'
ences. We also reviewed fertility projections for Ukraine and other Eastern European countries, 
and the history of fertility in the former Soviet Union. Ultimately, we decided to use fertility rates 
that increase from . today to . by the year . If the fertility rate is left unchanged, the 
population of Ukraine declines by nearly % after  years. This seems unlikely. On the other 
hand, almost all projections show a population decline. Our assumed mortality rate leads to an 
% population decline over a  year period and % over  years '' still quite significant. Our 
population projections as of  are slightly higher than the National Academy’s and less than 
government projections. 
Mortality: Starting mortality rates were obtained from  and  Derzhkomstat studies of 
Ukrainian mortality. These rates are considerably higher than mortality rates in Ukraine in the 
s, and should decline over time, with economic growth and improvements in health care. 
We studied mortality rates for a variety of North American, Eastern and Western European coun'
tries and in the former Soviet Union. These rates were obtained from the UN  Demographic 
Almanac. Ultimately, we decided to use U.S.  mortality for the ultimate Ukrainian mortality 
rates in . Mortality rates were assumed to decline linearly over  years, and then remain 
level. While the selection of ultimate mortality rates is somewhat arbitrary, studies done by our 
project and others shows that changes in mortality have less effect on the population and pension 
system projections than fertility rates. 
Net migration: Since independence, Ukraine has experienced net emigration – mostly to the West, 
Israel or Russia. Over the longer term, Ukraine can expect to experience net immigration, espe'
cially from poorer and more crowded Central Asian republics, and perhaps from the return of 
diaspora Ukrainians. Based on discussions with the National Academy of Sciences, we project 
continued net emigration for the next few years of about , people per year. However, our 
long'run assumption is net immigration of , per year, about the level prevailing in Soviet 
days. 
. Labour spreadsheet 
Labour force participation rate and unemployment rate: The  labour force study by Derzhkomstat 
was used as the basis for calculating labour force participation rates and unemployment rates. 
Earnings profile: These variables were not used in our analysis. The earnings profile is used only if 
the user chooses to use a benefit formula approach instead of a replacement ratio approach. 
. Pension spreadsheet 
Number employed: The total number of employed Ukrainians in the formal and informal sector 
combined is calculated. It is equal to the population multiplied by the employment coverage rate 
(discussed below). 
Number of existing pensioners: The model requires pensioners to be divided into four different 
types: old'age pensioners, disabled pensioners, survivors and social pensioners. The total num'
ber of pensioners by type was taken from Report # as of January , . However, this report 
does not provide information about benefits by age and sex. To disaggregate, we used the per'
sonified database for Mykolaiv oblast to get these distributions and then extrapolated to all pen'
sioners. In addition, the PROST model does not project new pensioners in the first year of the 
model. This means the figures put into the model must represent the average number of pen'
sioners for the year rather than the number at the beginning of the year. Consequently, we ad'
justed the beginning of the year numbers, based on projections from our Excel model. 
Employment coverage as a percent of the population: The total number of workers each year is com'
puted from these percentages. Employment coverage is equal to the product of the labour force 
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participation rate – which shows the percent of the total population at each age who are capable 
of working – and the employment rate (which is equal to one minus the unemployment rate). 
Retirement, disability, survivor and social pensioner rates as a percent of the population: This is the percent 
of the population, by age and sex, in each of these four categories each year. The initial values 
are derived by dividing the number of such pensioners at the beginning of the projection period 
by the population at the beginning of the projection period. We analysed these percentages for 
reasonableness. In many cases, the pattern of rates by age seemed questionable. Consequently, 
we developed a “smoothed” set of percentages, phased in over  years. We also recognised that 
the percentage of the population receiving disability and survivor benefit today will change sig'
nificantly in the future. Today there are many very old Ukrainians receiving disability and survi'
vor benefits, because of the Second World War. The number of such pensioners should decline 
sharply in the future due to mortality, and there will not be an equivalent number of new dis'
abled pensioners and survivors to take their place. Consequently, we developed a set of “ulti'
mate” percentages, and coded the model to grade smoothly from the current to the ultimate 
percentages over  years. This corrected the theoretical errors, and also produced a smooth 
transition and reasonable results over the transition period.  
Evasion and exemption rate: The evasion and exemption rate is the percent of the official labour 
force that does not make contributions to the pension system – either because they are not re'
quired to make contributions by law, or because of evasion. In Ukraine, this includes career mili'
tary personnel, who have their own pension system and are not required to contribute to the 
Pension Fund, and the shadow economy, which evades their responsibility to make contribu'
tions. In the PROST model, the evasion and exemption rate is the link between the number of 
workers and the number of contributors. To calculate this rate, we estimated the number of con'
tributors using our Excel model (as described below), and then used this to calculate the evasion 
and exemption rate. Because this data is aggregated, we were forced to assume that the evasion 
rate was the same by age and sex. Of course, this is unlikely to be true. Further analysis is needed 
in this area. 
Number of contributors: The Pension Fund has little reliable data on the number of contributors. 
This is because enterprises make a single lump'sum contribution to the Pension Fund on behalf 
of all its employees. During this year, all employers are required to report personified data for 
their employees. By early next year, a much more accurate measure of the number of contribu'
tors and their characteristics should be available. In the absence of full'personified information, 
we used Pension Fund budget aggregates to calculate the approximate number of contributors. 
The Pension Fund gave us information regarding the number of formal sector workers in the 
economy, total number of theoretical contributors, expected contributions, payroll basis for 
those contributions, and the theoretical wage fund for all potential contributors. Using our Excel 
model, we tried different combinations of the various parameters affecting total contributions 
until we found a reasonable set of variables that roughly reproduced the Pension Fund data we 
were given. Based on this technique, we estimated there were about . million contributors to 
the Pension Fund in .  
Old*age and disability replacement rates: These variables are used to calculate the benefits which will 
be received by future retirees. It is the ratio of benefits at retirement to pay at retirement. We 
estimated the starting values using Report  as of January , , which shows the average 
benefit payable by type of retirement to those who retired in . The replacement ratio for old'
age pensioners reflects the actual pay and length of service of retirees just prior to the time they 
retired, the current mix of ordinary pensioners and privileged pensioners, and the impact of the 
maximum and minimum pension provisions. It is not correct to calculate the benefit for an indi'
vidual making the average wage with the average length of service, and use this replacement ra'
tio. This fails to reflect the skewed distribution of pay in Ukraine – many workers receiving low 
wages and few receiving high wages. The current benefit formula produces very different re'
Pension reform 
Policy Studies, October   
placement ratios, depending on pay at retirement. Consequently, the replacement ratio used in 
the model must accurately reflect the actual mix of pay levels, and the actual mix of ordinary and 
privileged pensioners. We developed a separate model that projects replacements ratios by year 
of retirement, level of pay, and benefit formula characteristics. The method used to calculate 
disability replacement ratios was also based on Report #. 
. Adjustments to reflect the draft Law 
The draft law introduces many changes that are challenging to program using the PROST model. 
Of greatest importance are the changes in pension age and the changes affecting the calculation 
of benefits – accrual rates, maximum cap phase'out, and introduction of the wage cap. PROST 
provides several automatic tools to reflect changes in retirement rates. Essentially, PROST auto'
matically adjusts labour force participation rates, unemployment rates, employment coverage 
rates, and retirement and disability rates as a percent of the population to reflect the increased 
retirement age. Workers are assumed to remain in the work force longer and make contributions 
for a longer period of time. 
To determine the impact of the draft law on the replacement rates requires careful modelling. 
The average impact will not be equal to the impact on the average person earning the average 
wage. The only good way to determine the impact is to determine replacement ratios for indi'
viduals of different ages and with different earnings, under the current and draft laws, and then 
calculate the weighted average and use it as input to the model. 
Our “best'estimate” PROST coding assumes that over time the overall economic situation in 
Ukraine will improve. In the short run, the economic outlook is poor. However, we assumed in 
the long run economic growth will be accompanied by significant increases in wages, growing 
GDP, improving general health conditions, increased fertility, and declining mortality. If eco'
nomic progress is not made, then all social protection systems, including pensions, will face se'
vere problems. Only economic growth can allow for improvements in the lives of Ukrainians and 
stability in its social and financial programs. Consequently, our best'estimate analysis assumes 
that at least moderate economic growth and social development will occur. 
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